holding that another Supreme Court decision finding that a particular warrantless search lacked probable cause and contravened the Fourth Amendment would not be applied retroactively to defendant’s case even though it was pending on appeal on date the decision was announced
How later courts described this case
- holding that another Supreme Court decision finding that a particular warrantless search lacked probable cause and contravened the Fourth Amendment would not be applied retroactively to defendant’s case even though it was pending on appeal on date the decision was announced
- holding not retroactive the rule in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), which requires probable cause to justify automobile searches conducted by roving border patrols
- holding nonretroactive Al-meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), which invalidated warrantless automobile searches conducted without probable cause by roving border patrols
- applying prospectively only the rule of Almeida-Sanchez v. United *481 States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973), that a warrantless border search of an automobile without probable cause violated the fourth amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brown v. State, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 19763 (2009)
422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975), the Court held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable where police had acted in good faith reliance upon the same statute in a pre-
Distinguished by United States v. Jesus Gonzalez Soria, Jr., 519 F.2d 1060 (1975)
Under these circumstances, the rationale of the Supreme Court in Peltier and Bowen is inapplicable, and we must judge this search under the standards set out in our decisions on customs searches.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I agree with my Brother Brennan that Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973), reaffirmed traditional Fourth Amendment principles and that the purposes of the exclusionary rule compel exclusion of the unconstitutionally seized evidence in this case. I adhere to my view that a constitutional rule made retroactive in one case must be applied retroactively in all. See my dissent in Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U. S. 31, 33 (1975), and cases cited. It is largely a matter of chance that we held the Border Patrol to the command of the Fourth Amendment in Almeida-Sanchez rather than in the case of this defendant. Equal justice does not permit a defendant’s fate to depend upon such a fortuity. The judgment below should be affirmed.