holding Rochester-area, residents lacked standing to challenge suburb’s zoning as unconstitutionally excluding low- and moderate-income residents where plaintiffs were unable to allege other than in conclusory terms that they had been injured; where none of the plaintiffs personally owned property in the suburb or had been denied a variance or permit by the suburb; and where the plaintiffs’ “inability to reside in [the suburb was] the consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather than respondents’ assertedly illegal acts”
How later courts described this case
- holding Rochester-area, residents lacked standing to challenge suburb’s zoning as unconstitutionally excluding low- and moderate-income residents where plaintiffs were unable to allege other than in conclusory terms that they had been injured; where none of the plaintiffs personally owned property in the suburb or had been denied a variance or permit by the suburb; and where the plaintiffs’ “inability to reside in [the suburb was] the consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather than respondents’ assertedly illegal acts”
- concluding that because "whatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, . . . both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof" and therefore, "to obtain relief . . . , each member of [the association] who claims injury as a result of respondents' practices m[u]st be a party to the suit and [the association] has no standing to claim damages on [the individual member's] behalf"
- explaining that it is within the trial court’s power to allow or require a plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiffs standing; if after this opportunity, the plaintiffs standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed
- recognizing that while standing "in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal” it "often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted” such that a court must consider whether the law grants a right of action to persons "seeltpng] relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) — not on the Supreme Court's list
Lujan abrogated Warth
Distinguished
Distinguished by Puerto Rico Dairy Farmers Ass'n v. Pagan, 35 F. Supp. 3d 210 (2014)
PRDFA argued that Warth is distinguishable from the instant suit because in Warth, the damage claims, meaning that the PRDFA lacked relief.
Distinguished by Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)
We think Warth is distinguishable.
Distinguished by Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Herbert Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (1976)
The decision of the Supreme Court as to the standing of certain organizations and associations to attack zoning ordinances and other actions of town boards, in Warth v. Seldin, 1975, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, is inapposite here.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
With all respect, I think that the Court reads the complaint and the record with antagonistic eyes. There are in the background of this case continuing strong tides of opinion touching on very sensitive matters, some of which involve race, some class distinctions based on wealth.
A clean, safe, and well-heated home is not enough for some people. Some want to live where the neighbors are congenial and have social and political outlooks similar to their own. This problem of sharing areas of the community is akin to that when one wants to control the kind of person who shares his own abode. Metro-Act of Rochester, Inc., and the Housing Council in the Monroe County Area, Inc. — two of the associations which bring this suit — do in my opinion represent the communal feeling of the actual residents and have standing.
The associations here are in a position not unlike that confronted by the Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958). Their protest against the creation of this segregated community expresses the desire of their members to live in a desegregated community — a desire which gives standing to sue under the Civil Rights Act *519 of 1968 as we held in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972). Those who voice these views here seek to rely on other Civil Rights Acts and on the Constitution, but they too should have standing, by virtue of the dignity of their claim, to have the case decided on the merits.
Standing has become a barrier to access to the federal courts, just as “the political question” was in earlier decades. The mounting caseload of federal courts is well known. But cases such as this one reflect festering sores in our society; and the American dream teaches that if one reaches high enough and persists there is a forum where justice is dispensed. I would lower the technical barriers and let the courts serve that ancient need. They can in time be curbed by legislative or constitutional restraints if an emergency arises.
We are today far from facing an emergency. For in all frankness, no Justice of this Court need work more than four days a week to carry his burden. I have found it a comfortable burden carried even in my months of hospitalization.
As Mr. Justice Brennan makes clear in his dissent, the alleged purpose of the ordinance under attack was to preclude low- and moderate-income people and nonwhites from living in Penfield. The zoning power is claimed to have been used here to foist an un-American community model on the people of this area. I would let the case go to trial and have all the facts brought out. Indeed, it would be better practice to decide the question of standing only when the merits have been developed.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals.