stating that “[sjilence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, ... failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[sjilence gains more probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, ... failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in question.”
- concluding “the respondent’s silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and that any reference to his silence under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact”
- noting that "[i]n most circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force," and stating that a variety of factors, e.g., intimidation by situation, fear, or unwillingness to incriminate another may cause the defendant to remain silent
- holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask the defendant “why he had not given the police his alibi when he was questioned shortly after his arrest”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546 (1977)
422 U.S. 171, 45 L.Ed. 2d 99, 95 S.Ct. 2133 (1975), cited by defendant in support of his position, is distinguishable from this case on its facts.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
I am no more enthusiastic about Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), now than I was when that decision was announced. But when a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he may have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his *183 silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 196-199 (1943). Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case. I would affirm on this ground.