explaining that the Blockburger test “serves a generally similar function of identifying congressional intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or transaction. In determining whether separate punishment might be imposed, Blockburger requires that courts examine the offenses to ascertain ‘whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the Blockburger test “serves a generally similar function of identifying congressional intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or transaction. In determining whether separate punishment might be imposed, Blockburger requires that courts examine the offenses to ascertain ‘whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ”
- holding "that the history and structure of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 mánifest a clear and unmistakable legislative judgment that more than outweighs any presumption of merger between the conspiracy * * * and the consummation of that substantive offense”
- holding that Wharton’s Rule did not apply because a review of the applicable statutes showed that Congress did not intend that conspiracy to violate a federal gambling statute be merged with the substantive gambling offense
- holding that the legislative intent expressed in the history and structure of the act prohibiting illegal gambling manifested a clear intent to punish conspiracy as a distinct offense, outweighing any presumption of merger
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) — not on the Supreme Court's list
420 U.S. 770 (1975), overruled by Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 16, 19773 citing opinionsother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan*,
dissenting.
In Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 (1955), this Court held that in criminal cases “[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Id., at 83 . I agree with Mr. Justice Douglas that “[§] 1955 is . . . most sensibly viewed as a statute directed at conspiracy in a particular context,” ante, at 795, and that the statute is at best silent on whether punishment for both the substantive crime and conspiracy was intended. In this situation, I would invoke Bell’s, rule of lenity. I therefore dissent.