explaining that “a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards. . . . But, of course, a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards. . . . But, of course, a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them.”
- stating that while "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards," it "may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them"
- explaining that voluntary 10 UNITED STATES v. NICHOLS statements to be used for impeachment "would provide valuable aid to the jury in assessing the defendant’s credibility" and that "there is sufficient deterrence when the evidence in question is made unavail- able to the prosecution in its case in chief"
- explaining that voluntary statements to be used for impeachment “would provide valuable aid to the jury in assessing the defendant’s credibility” and that “there is sufficient deterrence when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,
dissenting.
In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), petitioner was not informed of his right to appointed counsel and thus his subsequent statements to police were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Court nonetheless permitted the use of those statements to impeach petitioner’s trial testimony. The Court today extends Harris to a case where the accused was told of his rights and asked for a lawyer, yet police questioning continued in violation of Miranda . The statements that resulted are again held admissible for impeachment purposes.
I adhere to my dissent in Harris in which I stated that Miranda “completely disposes of any distinction between statements used on direct as opposed to cross-examination. ‘An incriminating statement is as incriminating when used to impeach credibility as it is when used as direct proof of guilt and no constitutional distinction can legitimately be drawn.’ ” Harris, supra, at 231 . I adhere as well to the view that the judiciary must “avoid even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). “[I]t is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that ‘[njothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard *725 of the charter of its own existence.’ ” Harris, supra, at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court’s decision today goes beyond Harris in undermining Miranda . Even after Harris , police had some incentive for following Miranda by warning an accused of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. If the warnings were given, the accused might still make a statement which could be used in the prosecution’s case in chief. Under today’s holding, however, once the warnings are given, police have almost no incentive for following Miranda’s requirement that “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Miranda, supra, at 474 . If the requirement is followed there will almost surely be no statement since the attorney will advise the accused to remain silent. 1 If, however, the requirement is disobeyed, the police may obtain a statement which can be used for impeachment if the accused has the temerity to testify in his own defense. 2 Thus, after today’s decision, if an individual states that he wants an attorney, police interrogation will doubtless be vigorously pressed to obtain statements before the attorney arrives. I am unwilling to join this fundamental erosion of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights and *726 therefore dissent. I would affirm or, at least, remand for further proceedings for the reasons given in Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion.
See, e. g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (“any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances”). See also Comment, 80 Yale L. J. 1198, 1220 (1971) (“[the police] realize that as soon as a lawyer arrives there is little chance that any further questioning will be permitted”).
As I pointed out in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), “the accused is denied an ‘unfettered’ choice when the decision whether to take the stand is burdened by the risk that an illegally obtained prior statement may be introduced to impeach his direct testimony denying complicity in the crime charged against him.” Id., at 230 (BkennaN, J., dissenting).