holding unconstitutional statutory classification giving to widowed mothers benefits not available to widowed fathers even though “the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support”
How later courts described this case
- holding unconstitutional statutory classification giving to widowed mothers benefits not available to widowed fathers even though “the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support”
- holding unconstitutional a Social Security Act classification authorizing benefits to widows but not to widowers despite the fact that the justification for the differential treatment was "not entirely without empirical support"
- holding that a statute that treats widowers less favorably than widows — which, in the Title VII context, might have been called a “sex plus marital status” claim — violates the Equal Protection Clause
- explaining that the Supreme Court’s “approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., 1979 Mo. LEXIS 286 (1979)
The social security cases of Califano v. Goldfarb, supra, and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, are also distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in the result.
Part III-B of the Court's opinion contains a thorough examination of the legislative history and statutory context which define the role and purpose of § 402 (g). I believe the Court's examination convincingly demonstrates that the only purpose of § 402 (g) is to make it possible for children of deceased contributing workers to have the personal care and attention of a surviving parent, should that parent desire to remain in the home with the child. Moreover, the Court’s opinion establishes that the Government’s proffered legislative purpose is so totally at odds with the context and history of § 402 (g) that it cannot serve as a basis for judging whether the statutory distinction between men and women rationally serves a valid legislative objective.
This being the case, I see no necessity for reaching the issue of whether the statute's purported discrimination against female workers violates the Fifth Amendment as applied in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). I would simply conclude, as does the Court in Part III-B of its opinion, that the restriction of § 402 (g) benefits to surviving mothers does not rationally serve any valid legislative purpose, including that for which § 402 (g) was obviously designed. This is so because it is irrational to distinguish between mothers and fathers when the sole question is whether a child of a deceased contributing worker should have the opportunity to receive the full-time attention of the only parent remaining to it. To my mind, that should be the end of the matter. I therefore concur in the result.