explaining that “[b]ecause the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified” the decision that the claims of the purported representative were moot dictated dismissal of the uncertified “class” action as well
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[b]ecause the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified” the decision that the claims of the purported representative were moot dictated dismissal of the uncertified “class” action as well
- determining that an action improperly certified under Rule 23(a) was moot when the named plaintiffs no longer attended the defendant school and therefore no longer had a live case or controversy
- holding that when the named plaintiffs are dismissed from the class action and the class itself has not been properly certified, the complaint of the class must be simultaneously dismissed
- holding that a class action is moot unless it was duly certified pursuant to Rule 23 and a controversy still exists between the present members of the class and the defendant
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
In any event, it is clear that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have eroded the rigidity of the rule Sosna articulated, and Jacobs and Weinstein appear, in fact, to have been effectively overruled.
unconfirmed confidence
Distinguished
Distinguished by McLaughin v. Hoffman, 547 F.2d 918 (1977)
But Jacobs is distinguishable from appellant McLaughlin’s case in at least two critical respects.
The opinion
Per Curiam.
This action was brought in the District Court by six named plaintiffs seeking to have declared unconstitutional certain regulations and rules promulgated by the petitioner Board and to have the enforcement of those regulations and rules enjoined, as well as seeking other relief no longer relevant to this case. * In the complaint, the named plaintiffs stated that the action was brought as a *129 class action pursuant to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 23 (a) and (b)(2), and further stated that “[pjlaintiff class members are all high school students attending schools managed, controlled, and maintained by the Board of School Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis.” At the time this action was brought, plaintiffs were or had been involved in the publication and distribution of a student newspaper, and they alleged that certain actions taken by petitioner Board or its subordinates, as well as certain of its rules and regulations, interfered or threatened to interfere with the publication and distribution of the newspaper in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs (respondents here) prevailed on the merits of their action in the District Court, 349 F. Supp. 605 (SD Ind. 1972), and the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting in part, affirmed, 490 F. 2d 601 (CA7 1973). Petitioners brought the case to this Court, and we granted certiorari, 417 U. S. 929 (1974). At oral argument, we were informed by counsel for petitioners that all of the named plaintiffs in the action had graduated from the Indianapolis school system; in these circumstances, it seems clear that a case or controversy no longer exists between the named plaintiffs and the petitioners with respect to the validity of the rules at issue. The case is therefore moot unless it was duly certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, a controversy still exists between petitioners and the present members of the class, and the issue in controversy is such that it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975). Because in our view there was inadequate compliance with the requirements of Rule 23 (c), we have concluded that the case has become moot.
The only formal entry made by the District Court below purporting to certify this case as a class action is con *130 tained in that court’s “Entry on Motion for Permanent Injunction,” wherein the court “conclude [d] and ordered” that “the remaining named plaintiffs are qualified as proper representatives of the class whose interest they seek to protect.” 349 F. Supp., at 611 . No other effort was made to identify the class or to certify the class action as contemplated by Rule 23 (c)(1); nor does the quoted language comply with the requirement of Rule 23 (c)(3) that “[t]he judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision ... (b)(2) . . . shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.” The need for definition of the class purported to be represented by the named plaintiffs is especially important in cases like this one where the litigation is likefy to become moot as to the initially named plaintiffs prior to the exhaustion of appellate review. Because the class action was never properly certified nor the class properly identified by the District Court, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to order the District Court to vacate its judgment and to dismiss the complaint.
So ordered.
The named plaintiffs sought expunction from their respective records of certain information and compensatory and punitive damages against petitioners. These prayers for relief were denied by the District Court for failure of proof and no appeal was taken from this decision.