explaining that a state garnishment statute was vulnerable to constitutional attack under the Fourteenth Amendment because the plaintiff’s “property[] was impounded and, absent a bond, put totally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on the al- leged debt”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a state garnishment statute was vulnerable to constitutional attack under the Fourteenth Amendment because the plaintiff’s “property[] was impounded and, absent a bond, put totally beyond use during the pendency of the litigation on the al- leged debt”
- holding that a Georgia statute was unconstitutional because it allowed the impounding of the defendant’s bank account “during the pendency of the litigation on the alleged debt” without sufficient safeguards against an unduly burdensome deprivation of property
- holding that a Georgia garnishment statute was unconstitutional, and noting that unlike the statute in Mitchell, the Georgia statute allowed a writ of garnishment to enter before a judge had reviewed the garnishor’s application
- holding that the decisions of the circuit court may also foreclose constitutional challenges
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Me. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 , see Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 629-636 (dissenting opinion), seems to have been greatly exaggerated. Cf. S. Clemens, cable from Europe to the Associated Press, quoted in 2 A. Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1912).