holding that in light of “the alternative channels of 20 communication that are open to prison inmates, a restriction on one manner in which 21 prisoners can communicate with persons outside of prison was not unconstitutional as long 22 as the restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the 23 expression, falls within the ‘appropriate rules and regulations’ to which ‘prisoners 24 necessarily are subject,’ and does not abridge any First Amendment freedoms retained by 25 prison inmates.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that in light of “the alternative channels of 20 communication that are open to prison inmates, a restriction on one manner in which 21 prisoners can communicate with persons outside of prison was not unconstitutional as long 22 as the restriction operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the 23 expression, falls within the ‘appropriate rules and regulations’ to which ‘prisoners 24 necessarily are subject,’ and does not abridge any First Amendment freedoms retained by 25 prison inmates.”
- explaining that “challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law”
- stating the premise of general deterrence is that “by confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are isolated from the rest of society, a condition that most people 86 presumably find undesirable, they and others will be deterred from committing additional criminal offenses”
- holding inmates’ First Amendment rights, including the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, was not violated by a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction “in light of the alternative channels of communication that are open to prison inmates”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
Procunier and Saxbe are distinguishable in the sense that they were concerned with penal institutions which, by definition, are not “open” or public places.
Distinguished by Alexander v. National Farmers Organization, 405 F. Supp. 118 (1975)
Pell v. Procunier, Corrections Director, 417 U.S. 817, 835, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), cited by AMPI, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
These cross-appeals concern the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of a regulation of the California Department of Corrections that prohibits all personal interviews of prison inmates by representatives of the news media. This regulation is substantially identical to the United States Bureau of Prisons policy statement whose validity is at issue in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., post, p. 843. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in that case, post, p. 850, I would hold that California’s absolute ban against prisoner-press interviews impermissibly restrains the ability of the press to perform its constitutionally established function of informing the people on the conduct of their government. Accordingly, I dissent from the judgment of the Court.
The California cross-appeals differ from the Washington Post case in one significant respect. Here the constitutionality of the interview ban is challenged by prisoners as well as newsmen. Thus these appeals, unlike Washington Post, raise the question whether, inmates as *836 individuals have a personal constitutional right to demand interviews with willing reporters. Because I agree with the majority that they do not, I join Part I of the opinion of the Court.