explaining that in the absence of the traditional protection of a lien upon which subcontractors on government projects can rely, “[t]he Miller Act was intended to provide an alternative remedy to protect the rights of these suppliers”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that in the absence of the traditional protection of a lien upon which subcontractors on government projects can rely, “[t]he Miller Act was intended to provide an alternative remedy to protect the rights of these suppliers”
- finding that an attorney’s fees provision must be included in either the general contract or the payment bond
- recognizing the federal courts' ability to impose inherent power sanctions to the lawyers' firm or employer
- holding that the inherent power of the court to award attorney’s fees applies where the losing party has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in part.
The Court, dealing with the Miller Act’s predecessor, held in Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., 244 U. S. 376, 380 , that the Heard Act “must be construed liberally.” That same principle applies to the Miller Act. Fleisher Co. v. United States ex rel. Hallenbeck, 311 U. S. 15, 17-18 . The Act is silent as to attorneys’ fees, saying only that the payment bond shall allow the supplier “to prosecute said action to final execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due him.” 40 U. S. C. § 270b (a).
*132 The Miller Act is unlike the Lanham Act involved in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U. S. 714 . That Act itemized the components of the remedy which the Act afforded: injunctive relief, treble damages, and “costs” (which by federal statute did not include attorneys’fees). Id., at 719-720 . Moreover, attempts to amend the Lanham Act to include attorneys’ fees had never succeeded, id., at 721 . Here there is no such legislative history; nor does the Miller Act itemize the components of the “sum or sums justly due.”
The Court says that dependence on state law is inappropriate, for we deal with a federal standard that should be uniform. That takes great liberties with the Miller Act. Here the contract and law were made in California and were to be performed there. In Illinois Surety Co. v. John Davis Co., supra, the contract and law were made in Illinois and were to be performed there. “Questions of liability for interest must therefore be determined by the law of that State,” said Mr. Justice Brandéis speaking for the Court, 244 U. S., at 381 . If state law would give the claimant interest, it should give him attorneys’ fees based on the purpose of the Miller Act. Judge Carter writing for the Court of Appeals pointed out that the Miller Act is the federal equivalent of state lien laws. See 473 F. 2d 720 , 727. The remedy in a federal suit is therefore properly composed of the same elements as would be available to lien claimants in a state court collecting for labor and materials furnished on nonfederal projects. One of the elements of recovery permitted in a California court is attorneys' fees. The “sum or sums justly due” should as a matter of federal law be construed to be the same as that -due a claimant whose remedy is based on a state statute, when the federal remedy was intended to be the equivalent of the state remedy.
*133 What Mr. Justice Brandéis said of interest is equally applicable to attorneys’ fees under the Miller Act. * Under the circumstances present here it would seem quite unjust not to include in the sum that is due the cost of collecting that sum.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit awarded attorneys’ fees under a Florida statute where suit was brought under the Miller Act, United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Construction Co., 430 F. 2d 420, 425 . And see United States ex rel. White Masonry, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Co., 434 F. 2d 855, 859 , where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed Alaska law.