stating that trade secret law does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means such as independent invention, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering; however, protection will be awarded to trade secret holder against disclosure or unauthorized use by those to whom secret has been confided, either under express or implied restriction of non-disclosure or by one who has gained knowledge by improper means
How later courts described this case
- stating that trade secret law does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means such as independent invention, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering; however, protection will be awarded to trade secret holder against disclosure or unauthorized use by those to whom secret has been confided, either under express or implied restriction of non-disclosure or by one who has gained knowledge by improper means
- holding that state trade secret law is not categorically preempted by federal patent law, noting that “[a] most fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or is made profitable; the state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is unchallengeable” (footnote omitted)
- holding that unjust enrichment claims based on alleged wrongful use of confidential research results were not preempted by federal law
- concluding that some novelty is required “if merely because that which does not possess novelty is usually known; secrecy, in the context of trade secrets, thus implies at least minimal novelty”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 1174 (1985)
416 U.S. 470, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 40 L.Ed.2d 315 (1974), upon which Colt relies, are inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
concurring in the result.
Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the possibility that an inventor with a patentable invention will rely *494 on state trade secret law rather than apply for a patent is “remote indeed.” Ante, at 490. State trade secret law provides substantial protection to the inventor who intends to use or sell the invention himself rather than license it to others,, protection which in its unlimited duration is clearly superior to the 17-year monopoly afforded by the patent laws.' I have no doubt that the existence of trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the policy of the patent laws to encourage. This case may well be such an instance.
But my view of sound policy in this area does not dispose of' this case. Rather, the question presented in this case is whether Congress, in enacting the patent laws, intended merely to offer inventors a limited monopoly in exchange for disclosure of their invention, or instead to exert pressure on inventors to enter into this exchange by withdrawing any alternative possibility of legal protection for their inventions. I am persuaded that the former is the case. State trade secret laws and the federal patent laws have co-existed for many, many years. During this time, Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its' full awareness of the existence of the trade secret system, without any indication of disapproval. Indeed, Congress has in a number of instances given explicit federal protection to trade secret information provided to federal agencies. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 552 (b) (4); 18 U. S. C. § 1905 ; see generally Appendix to Brief for Petitioner. Because of this, I conclude that there is “neither such actual conflict between the two. schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, nor evidence of a congressional design to preempt the' field.” Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, *495 373 U. S. 132, 141 (1963). I therefore concur in the result reached by. the majority of the Court.