holding that a zoning ordinance restricting the use of land to “one-family dwellings” did not infringe upon various constitutional rights because “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs[,]” and it is permissible “to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a zoning ordinance restricting the use of land to “one-family dwellings” did not infringe upon various constitutional rights because “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs[,]” and it is permissible “to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”
- holding that lines drawn by legislatures in economic and social legislation will be respected by courts against the charge of violation of the equal protection clause if the law is reasonable, not arbitrary, and bears a rational relationship to a permissible state objective
- holding ordinance that limits occupancy of one-family dwellings to families constitutional where ordinance “place[s] no ban on other forms of association,” since “a ‘family’ may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it likes”
- holding that in equal protection cases not involving a suspect classification or Id. at 106 . Thus, even if only injunctive relief were sought, fundamental right, courts apply a rational basis test
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hopkins v. Zoning Hearing Board, 55 Pa. Commw. 365 (1980)
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) relied upon by the township is distinguishable from the instant case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
dissenting.
The constitutional challenge to the village ordinance is premised solely on alleged infringement of associational and other constitutional rights of tenants. But the named tenant appellees have quit the house, thus raising a serious question whether there now exists a cognizable “case or controversy” that satisfies that indispensable requisite of Art. Ill of the Constitution. Existence of a case or controversy must, of course, appear at every stage of review, see, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1973); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 , 459 n. 10 (1974). In my view it does not appear at this stage of this case.
Plainly there is no case or controversy as to the named tenant appellees since, having moved out, they no longer have an interest, associational, economic or otherwise, to be vindicated by invalidation of the ordinance. Whether there is a cognizable case or controversy must therefore turn on whether the lessor appellees may attack the ordinance on the basis of the constitutional rights of their tenants.
The general “weighty” rule of practice is “that a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities,” United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 22 (1960). A pertinent exception, however, ordinarily limits a litigant to the assertion of the alleged denial of another’s constitutional rights to situations in which there is: (1) evidence that as a direct consequence of the denial of constitutional rights of the others, the litigant faces substantial economic injury, Pierce v. Society of *11 Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535-536 (1925); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 255-256 (1953), or criminal prosecution, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 481 (1965); E isenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), and (2) a showing that the litigant’s and the others’ interests intertwine and unless the litigant may. assert the constitutional rights of the others, those rights cannot effectively be vindicated. Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Eisenstadt y. Baird, supra; see also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
In my view, lessor appellees do not, on the present record, satisfy either requirement of the exception. Their own brief negates any claim that they face eco'nomic loss. The brief states that “there is nothing in the record to support the contention that in a middle class, suburban residential community like Belle Terre,, traditional families are willing to pay more or less than students xyith limited means like the Appellees.” Brief for Appellees 54 — 55. . And whether they face criminal prosecution for violations of. the. ordinance is at least unclear. The criminal, summons served on them on July 19, 1972, was withdrawn because not preceded, as required by the village’s procedure, by an order requiring discontinuance of violations within 48 hours. An order to discontinue violation was served thereafter on July 31, but was not followed by service of a criminal summons when the violation was not discontinued within 48 hours. *
The Court argues that, because a zoning ordinance “has an impact on the valüe of the property which it regulates,” there is a cognizable case or controversy. But *12 even if lessor appellees for that reason have a personal stake, and we were to concede that landlord and tenant interests intertwine in respect of the ordinance, I cannot see, on the present record, how it can be concluded that “it would be difficult if not impossible,” Barrows v. Jackson, supra, at 257 , for present or prospective unrelated tenant groups of more than two to assert their own rights before the courts, since the departed tenant appellees had no. difficulty in doing so. Thus, the second requirement of the exception would not presently appear to be satisfied. Accordingly it is irrelevant that the house wás let, as we are" now informed, to other unrelated tenants on a month-to-month basis after the tenant appellees moved out. None of the new tenants has sought to intervene in this suit. Indéed, for- all that appears, they too may have moved out and the house may be vacant;
I dissent and would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the District Court for further proceedings. ■ If the District Court determines that a cognizable case or controversy no longer exists, thé complaint should' be dismissed. Golden v Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969).
In these circumstances, I agree with the Court that ho criminal action was “pending” when this suit was brought and that therefore the District Court correctly declined to apply the' principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).