explaining that “there are statutes that by their terms ... apply without question to certain activities but whose application to other behavior is uncertain,” and thus actions within the statute’s core cannot be vague as applied to “hard-core violator[s] ... whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “there are statutes that by their terms ... apply without question to certain activities but whose application to other behavior is uncertain,” and thus actions within the statute’s core cannot be vague as applied to “hard-core violator[s] ... whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct”
- explaining that because people's behavior is typically "not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory language," the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice but, instead, the requirement that the legislature establish guidelines to limit the discretion of law enforcement
- finding vague broad statutoiy language that “was . . . devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the relevant time in this case,” while also noting existence of, but not searching for guidance in, similar statutes of federal and state governments that had been “universally] adopt[ed]”
- finding vague broad statutory language that "was ... devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the relevant time in this case," while also noting existence of, but not searching for guidance in, similar statutes of federal and state governments that had been "universal[ly] adopt[ed]"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Jacquez, 147 N.M. 313 (2009)
{12} Lastly, we disagree with Defendant’s argument that the present case is analogous to the circumstances addressed in Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568-76, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974).
Distinguished by United States v. James Glenn, 562 F.2d 324 (1977)
(1974) 415 U.S. 566, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, cited by the appellant, are clearly distinguishable from the present case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
with whom The Chief Justice joins, dissenting.
I agree with Mr. Justice White in his conclusion that the Massachusetts flag statute is not unconstitutionally vague. I disagree with his conclusion that the words “treats contemptuously” are necessarily directed at protected speech and that Goguen’s conviction for his immature antic therefore cannot withstand constitutional challenge.
*591 I agree with Mr. Justice Rehnquist when he concludes that the First Amendment affords no shield to Goguen’s conduct. I reach that result, however, not on the ground that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts “would read” the language of the Massachusetts statute to require that “treats contemptuously” entails physical contact with the flag and the protection of its physical integrity, but on the ground that' that court, by its unanimous rescript opinion, has in fact already done exactly that. The court’s opinion states that Goguen “was not prosecuted for being 'intellectually . . . diverse’ or for 'speech,’ as in Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 , 593-594 . . . .” Having rejected the vagueness challenge and concluded that Goguen was not punished for speech, the Massachusetts court, in upholding the conviction, has necessarily limited the scope of the statute to protecting the physical integrity of the flag. The requisite for “treating contemptuously” was found and the court concluded that punishment was not for speech — a communicative element. I, therefore, must conclude that Goguen’s punishment was constitutionally permissible for harming the physical integrity of the flag by wearing it affixed to the seat of his pants. I accept the Massachusetts court’s opinion at what I regard as its face value.