holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate when no state-court proceeding “is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed,” because in that circumstance “federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system”; it cannot “be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon [a] state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles”; and the absence of a pending state-court proceeding deprives “the federal plaintiff [of] a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights”
How later courts described this case
- holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate when no state-court proceeding “is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed,” because in that circumstance “federal intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system”; it cannot “be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon [a] state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles”; and the absence of a pending state-court proceeding deprives “the federal plaintiff [of] a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights”
- finding that when the petitioner had “been twice warned to stop the handbilling that he claim[ed was] constitutionally protected and ha[d] been told by police that if he again handbill[ed] at the shopping center and disobey[ed] a warning to stop he [would] likely be prosecuted,” it was “not necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claim[ed] deters the exercise of his constitutional rights”
- holding that “alleged threats cannot be characterized as ‘imaginary or speculative’ ” where petitioner was warned that continued exercise of his constitutional rights would result in prosecution and petitioner’s companion was prosecuted for engaging in the same conduct (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 91 S.Ct. 746, 749, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1758-1759, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961))
- holding, in a case where prosecution was threatened but not pending, that to require arrest before issuing declaratory relief would place “the hapless plaintiff between the Seylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Fieger v. Michigan Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955 (2009)
Id. at 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209. Steffel is readily distinguishable from this case.
Distinguished by Washington v. Boslow, 375 F. Supp. 1298 (1974)
The recent Supreme Court case of Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974), cited by the plaintiff, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring.
I offer the following few words in light of Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in which he discusses the impact on a pending federal action of a later filed criminal prosecution against the federal plaintiff, whether a federal court may enjoin a state criminal prosecution under a statute the federal court has earlier declared unconstitu *477 tional at the suit of the defendant now being prosecuted, and the question whether that declaratory judgment is res judicata in such a later filed state criminal action.
It should be noted, first, that his views on these issues are neither expressly nor impliedly embraced by the Court’s opinion filed today. Second, my own tentative views on these questions are somewhat contrary to my Brother’s.
At this writing at least, I would anticipate that a final declaratory judgment entered by a federal court holding particular conduct of the federal plaintiff to be immune on federal constitutional grounds from prosecution under state law should be accorded res judicata effect in any later prosecution of that very conduct. There would also, I think, be additional circumstances in which the federal judgment should be considered as more than a mere precedent bearing on the issue before the state court.
Neither can I at this stage agree that the federal court, having rendered a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, could not enjoin a later state prosecution for conduct that the federal court has declared immune. The Declaratory Judgment Act itself provides that a “declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree,” 28 U. S. C. § 2201 ; eminent authority anticipated that declaratory judgments would be res judicata, E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 10-11 (2d ed. 1941); and there is every reason for not reducing declaratory judgments to mere advisory opinions. Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941), once expressed the view that 28 U. S. C. § 2283 forbade injunctions against relitigation in state courts of federally decided issues, but the section was then amended to overrule that case, the consequence being that “[i]t is clear that the Toucey rule *478 is gone, and that to protect or effectuate its judgment a federal court may enjoin relitigation in the state court.” C. Wright, Federal Courts 180 (2d ed. 1970). I see no more reason here to hold that the federal plaintiff must always rely solely on his plea of res judicata in the state courts. The statute provides for “[fjurther necessary or proper relief . . . against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment,” 28 U. S. C. § 2202 , and it would not seem improper to enjoin local prosecutors who refuse to observe adverse federal judgments.
Finally, I would think that a federal suit challenging a state criminal statute on federal constitutional grounds could be sufficiently far along so that ordinary consideration of economy would warrant refusal to dismiss the federal case solely because a state prosecution has subsequently been filed and the federal question may be litigated there.