regarding expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent," but finding that legislative history showed that Congress had considered and rejected alternative remedy, and therefore understood statute as providing exclusive remedy
How later courts described this case
- regarding expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "even the most basic general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent," but finding that legislative history showed that Congress had considered and rejected alternative remedy, and therefore understood statute as providing exclusive remedy
- relying upon the ancient statutory construction maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, for the proposition that "[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode"
- noting that "[a] frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies"
- noting the "frequently stated principle of statutory construction . . . that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (1975)
414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result.
Although I am in agreement that the legislative history of the Amtrak Act provides a clear and convincing expression of Congress' intent to preclude anyone except the Attorney General and in certain situations an employee or his duly authorized representative from maintaining an action under, the Act against petitioners, I would leave open the question whether a private suit for mandamus under 28 U. S. C. § 1361 might be maintained against the Attorney General if his refusal to act under § 307 — even though within the letter of his authority — went “beyond any rational exercise of discretion.'' United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F. 2d 371, 374 (CA2 1968); see Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and “Nonstatutory'' Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308 , 333-335 (1967).