stating that an agency’s “ground for the departure from prior norms ... must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate”
How later courts described this case
- stating that an agency’s “ground for the departure from prior norms ... must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate”
- holding that an agency may depart from prior norms because “although the rule in general serves useful purposes, peculiarities of the case before it suggest that the rule not be applied in that case”
- holding that the State Housing Appeals Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously where it failed to apply or comport with its previously announced definition for "substantial completeness"
- describing an "agency’s duty to explain its departure from prior norms” and holding that when an agency departs from prior norms, its reasons "must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in the affirmance of the remand to the Commission and dissenting from the reversal of the decree authorizing the injunction.
Though I concur in the affirmance of the remand to the Interstate Commerce Commission, I dissent from the reversal of the decree authorizing the injunction, since in my view the District Court was quite correct in issuing its injunction. Arrow Transportation Co. v. *827 Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658 , is not relevant here, for the reason that 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7) only purports to control the suspension of rates up until the time the Commission has rendered a decision. After that decision has been made, the reviewing court has, I believe, the power to enjoin the affected rates. The new charges which the Commission would impose would have an immediate impact upon the grain-marketing system. It would affect the volume of business of the grain merchants, it would affect the employment of grain inspectors, and it would result in lower prices being paid to the farmers. None of these incidences can be remedied under the existing statutory scheme, because none of these interests is enabled to bring suit for a later rate refund. Hence, in my view, the grain trade and the farmers need this interim protection lest in inspection the marketing system suffer severe attrition during the period of remand. The deciding principle is that the District Court sits as a court of equity, United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S. 183, 191 , and as a court of equity has, I believe, ample power to protect the grain market nationally which would otherwise be without remedy under the existing statutory regime.
Jurisdiction is granted the District Court “to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul or suspend” any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a). For years, the type of order here involved * was not reviewable. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 . But that “negative” order concept was abandoned in Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125, 145 . The provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a), are an explicit grant of power to *828 provide injunctive relief. Under that Act the “governing principle” is “that it is the duty of a court of equity granting injunctive relief to do so upon conditions that will protect all — including the public — whose interests the injunction may affect.” Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U. S. 153, 157 . That power exists whether the Commission’s authority over rates is challenged under 49 U. S. C. § 15 (1) as being unjust or unreasonable or under 49 U. S. C. § 15 (7) relating, as here, to “a new individual or joint rate, fare, or charge.” In all cases the District Court by reason of 28 U. S. C. § 1336 (a) sits as a court of equity.
The order of Division 2 of the Commission provided that the proceeding “be, and it is hereby, discontinued.” 339 I. C. C. 364, 401. The order of the Commission en banc affirming is in 340 I. C. C. 69, 74.