holding that a probationer whose probation is revoked must be accorded due process; specifically, he “is entitled to two hearings, one a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole, and the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the final revocation decision.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a probationer whose probation is revoked must be accorded due process; specifically, he “is entitled to two hearings, one a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation of his parole, and the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the final revocation decision.”
- holding that “A Gagnon I hearing is a pre-revocation hearing to determine if probable cause exists that a violation was committed. After this determination is made, a Gagnon II hearing is conducted where the Commonwealth is required to establish that the defendant did violate his parole/probation.” Commonwealth v. Stafford, 29 A.3d 800 , 802 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011)
- holding that there is no difference relevant to the guarantee of procedural due process between revocation of parole and revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously because “[p]robation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a state of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty”
- explaining that “[probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty”; holding that probationers are entitled to the same due process protections as Morrissey specified for parolees
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
See United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir.2006) (rejecting defendant's argument that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), overruled Morrissey and Gagnon and finding that any right to confront witnesses at a probation hearing is rooted in due process, not the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in a criminal trial).
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Baldwin v. Benson — not on the Supreme Court's list
ts to distinguish Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting) (welfare termination hearing should include right to confront), Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1377 (1959) (individual should have had opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses before his security clearance was revoked by Department of Defense), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,…
Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitSep 28, 19782 citing opinionsby statuteunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by In re Parole of Hill, 298 Mich. App. 404 (2012)
480, and Gagnon, 411 US at 778, are inapposite.
Distinguished by State v. Cooley, 3 Conn. App. 410 (1985)
Furthermore, the cases cited by her, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), are inapposite.
Distinguished by Hughes v. Hinks, 249 Ga. 416 (1982)
The sheriff also argues that the dictates of Morrissey and Gagnon, supra, are inapplicable to a case such as this where the probationer admittedly “wilfully” failed to comply with the conditions of his probation.
Distinguished by Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976)
Undoubtedly both Gault and Gagnon are factually distinguishable from the summary court-martial proceeding here.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in part.
I believe that due process requires the appointment of counsel in this case because of the claim that respondent’s confession of the burglary was made under duress. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 498 (opinion of Douglas, J.).