holding that a defendant released on his own recognizance before beginning his sentence was “in custody” because he was “subject to restraints not shared by the public generally” in that he had an “obligation to appear at all times and places as ordered by any court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction” and his “freedom of movement rest[ed] in the hands of state judicial officers, who may demand his presence at any time and without a moment’s notice” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that a defendant released on his own recognizance before beginning his sentence was “in custody” because he was “subject to restraints not shared by the public generally” in that he had an “obligation to appear at all times and places as ordered by any court or magistrate of competent jurisdiction” and his “freedom of movement rest[ed] in the hands of state judicial officers, who may demand his presence at any time and without a moment’s notice” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)
- finding petitioner was in custody because his incarceration was not “a speculative possibility that depends on a number of contingencies” or “a case where the unfolding of events may render the entire controversy academic,” and delaying “would do no more than postpone [the] action until petitioner had begun service of his sentence”
- recognizing that a defendant released on OR, but who has not been convicted and sentenced, is also considered to be “in custody”
- holding that a petitioner released on his own recognizance pending appeal of his sentence was “in custody” for purpose of habeas
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Me. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
I emphasize again, as I did in my separate concurrence in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484, 501 (1973), that the Court has wandered a long way down the road in expanding traditional notions of habeas corpus. Indeed, the Court now concedes this. Ante, at 349. The present case is yet another step. Although recognizing that the custody requirement is designed to preserve the writ as a remedy for severe restraints on *354 individual liberty, ante, at 351, the Court seems now to equate custody with almost any restraint, however tenuous. One wonders where the end is. Nevertheless, in the light of cases already decided by the Court, I feel compelled to go along and therefore concur in the result.