stating that "[s]o long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ `within its jurisdiction' . . . even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction," which was recognized as dicta in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2723, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004)
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[s]o long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ `within its jurisdiction' . . . even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction," which was recognized as dicta in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 2723, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004)
- recognizing that a pretrial detainee, who has exhausted all available state remedies as a prelude to seeking federal habeas relief, may file a pretrial petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to the extent he seeks “to demand enforcement of the [State’s] affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial.”
- holding that a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 could proceed where the petitioner sought “only to demand enforcement of the [state’s] affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial” and the petitioner had exhausted all available state remedies toward that end.
- explaining that the exhaustion doctrine reflects “a careful balance between important interests of federalism and the need to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Solomon Monk, A/K/A David L. Martin v. Secretary of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364 (1986)
His claim is that he is also free to bring the action in the District of Columbia because it is here that his “ultimate custodian,” the Secretary of the Navy, resides.1 Nothing in Braden supports this assertion and we reject it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Conway v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 884 (1977)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1972), while establishing that a petitioner’s absence would no longer act as an absolute impediment to jurisdiction under all circumstances, limited its holding to a situation wherein dismissal of the petitioner’s application would leave him without any forum (supra at 487, 93 S.Ct. 1123).
Distinguished by Raffone v. Stack, 425 F. Supp. 345 (1976)
The affirmative defense to a pending prosecution based upon denial of a speedy trial must be distinguished from the demand for a speedy trial entertained in Bra-den v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, supra. There the petitioner was a state prisoner seeking to bring to a head the issue of the continuing validity of a pending out-of-state indictment and associated detainer.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result. The conclusion the Court reaches is not unexpected when one notes the extraordinary expansion of the concept of habeas corpus effected in recent years. See Ex parte Hull, 312 U. S. 546 (1941); Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236 (1963); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54 (1968); Carajus v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Nelson v. George, 399 U. S. 224 (1970). Cf. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U. S. 487 (1971). A trend of this kind, once begun, easily assumes startling proportions. The present case is but one more step, with the Alabama warden now made the agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
I do not go so far as to say that on the facts of this case the result is necessarily wrong. I merely point out that we have come a long way from the traditional notions of the Great Writ. The common-law scholars of the past hardly would recognize what the Court has developed, see 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *131-134, and they would, I suspect, conclude that it is not for the better.
The result in this case is not without its irony. The petitioner’s speedy trial claim follows upon his escape from Kentucky custody after that State, at its expense, had returned the petitioner from California to stand trial in Kentucky. Had he not escaped, his Kentucky trial would have taken place five years ago> Furthermore, the petitioner is free to assert his speedy trial claim in the Kentucky courts if and when he is brought to trial there. *502 And the claim, already strong on the facts here, increases in strength as time goes by.