explaining that “bankruptcy is not the only method available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors” because “[h]owever unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “bankruptcy is not the only method available to a debtor for the adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors” because “[h]owever unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors”
- holding that plaintiffs seeking an increase in welfare payments did not have an interest that rose to the constitutional significance as that of the plaintiffs in Bod-die v. Connecticut; therefore, the filing fee did not violate the plaintiffs’ right to court access
- holding that filing fees in bankruptcy proceedings did not deprive indigents of due process or equal protection because elimination of debt was not a fundamental interest and court proceedings were not the only means of adjusting relationships with creditors
- concluding that bankruptcy filing fee had a rational basis because Congress “sought to make the system self-sustaining and paid for by those who use it rather than by tax revenues drawn from the public at large”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I concur fully in the Court’s opinion. The painstaking and precise delineation by Mr. Justice Harlan of the interests involved in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), ought not to be ignored as the dissenting opinions would do. Moreover, the exclusivity of a State’s control of marriage and divorce is a far cry from the degree of government control over relations between debtor and creditor, as Mr. Justice Blackmun has pointed out. In a bankruptcy proceeding the government, through the court, is no more than the overseer and the administrator of the process; it is not the absolute and exclusive controller as with the dissolution of marriage. Like the descent and distribution of property for which all States have provided statutes and probate courts, the bankruptcy court is but one mode of orderly adjustment with creditors; it is not the only one since many debtors work out binding private adjustments with creditors.
*451 Surely there are strong arguments, as a matter of policy, for the result the dissenting view asserts. But Congress has not yet seen fit to declare the policy that the dissenters now find in the Constitution. In 1970 Congress authorized a tripartite commission to review the bankruptcy laws. 1 The commission has been engaged in its task for more than two years and it is hardly likely that this problem will escape its consideration. 2 The Constitution is not the exclusive source of law reform, even needed reform, in our system.
Pub. L. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
The commission’s mandate requires it to “study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes” in the Bankruptcy Act “in order for such Act to reflect and adequately meet the demands of present technical, financial, and commercial activities. The commission’s study . . . shall include a consideration of the basic philosophy of bankruptcy, the causes of bankruptcy, the possible alternatives to the present system of bankruptcy administration, the applicability of advanced management techniques to achieve economies in the administration of the Act, and all other matters which the Commission shall deem relevant.” Of particular relevance is the preamble to the Act creating the commission, which recites in part that “the technical aspects of the Bankruptcy Act are interwoven with the rapid expansion of credit which has reached proportions far beyond anything previously experienced by the citizens of the United States.”
The report of the commission is to be submitted prior to June 30, 1973. Pub. L. 92-251, 86 Stat. 63.