finding trial judge's threatening remarks effectively drove witness off the stand and deprived petitioner of due process when judge warned witness of his right to refuse to testify and of necessity to tell the truth, but also implied that he expected witness, who had a prior criminal record, to lie and as sured him that if he lied he would be prosecuted and time would be added to his present sentence and that result would be to impair his chances of parole.
How later courts described this case
- finding trial judge's threatening remarks effectively drove witness off the stand and deprived petitioner of due process when judge warned witness of his right to refuse to testify and of necessity to tell the truth, but also implied that he expected witness, who had a prior criminal record, to lie and as sured him that if he lied he would be prosecuted and time would be added to his present sentence and that result would be to impair his chances of parole.
- holding that a trial judge’s warnings to a defense witness about the dangers of perjury infringed on the defendant’s due process rights where the judge not only provided information of the consequences of perjury but also implied that the judge believed the witness would lie and assured the witness that if he lied he would be prosecuted for perjury and probably convicted
- holding that the defendant’s due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby “effectively drove that witness off the stand”
- holding that the defendant had been deprived due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment when a trial judge’s “lengthy and intimidating warning” and “threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Suter, 296 Kan. 137 (2012)
The State argues Webb is distinguishable for several reasons.
Distinguished by Jones v. State, 1995 Ind. LEXIS 118 (1995)
Jones cites Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972), as support, but this case is distinguishable from Webb.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Crowe, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 456 (1986)
409 U.S. 95 (1972), relied on by the defendants, is inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Jamiel Alexander Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (1982)
409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) is inapposite for the same reason.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,
dissenting.
The facts before us do not, in my opinion, justify the Court’s summary disposition. Petitioner Webb (who, on a prior occasion, had been convicted on still another *99 burglary charge) was apprehended by the owner of a lumber business. The owner, armed with his shotgun, had driven to his office at three o’clock in the morning upon the activation of a burglar alarm. When he entered the building, the owner observed a broken window and an assortment of what he regarded as burglary tools on his desk. When men emerged from an adjacent room, a gun fight ensued. Two intruders escaped, but the owner, despite his having been shot twice, succeeded in holding the petitioner at gunpoint until police arrived.
Although the admonition given by the state trial judge to the sole witness proffered by the defense was obviously improper, sufficient facts have not been presented to this Court to demonstrate the depth of prejudice that requires a summary reversal. The admonition might prove far less offensive, and the conduct of the trial judge understandable, if, for example, as is indicated in petitioner’s brief, p. 8, prepared by counsel and filed with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the witness were known to have been called for the purpose of presenting an alibi defense. Against the backdrop of being caught on the premises and of apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt, offset only by a bare allegation of prejudice, I would deny the petition for certiorari and, as the Court so often has done, I would remit the petitioner to the relief available to him by way of a post-conviction proceeding with a full evidentiary hearing. *
Petitioner’s counsel assured the Court of Criminal Appeals that the witness would not have been called “unless he had been previously interviewed and found to be helpful to the appellant’s cause.” Brief for Appellant on First Motion for Rehearing 7, Webb v. Texas, 480 S. W. 2d 398 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1972). An evidentiary hearing would allow petitioner’s trial counsel to outline the testimony that was expected from the witness.
A prior trial is mentioned in the record. An evidentiary hearing might reveal events at the prior trial that justified the trial judge’s unusual concern about possible perjury.