holding that a statement that striking employees “are being permanently replaced” constituted an unlawful discharge when permanent replacements had not been hired
How later courts described this case
- holding that a statement that striking employees “are being permanently replaced” constituted an unlawful discharge when permanent replacements had not been hired
- “employees striking in protest of an employer’s unfair labor practices are entitled, absent some contractural or statutory provision to the contrary, to unconditional reinstatement with back pay, ‘even if replacements for them have been made.’ ”
- economic strikers discharged prior to the hiring of permanent replacements entitled to reinstatement with back pay
- economic strikers subject to permanent replacement; unfair labor strikers generally entitled to reinstatement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
The result mandated by the narrow factual situation presented in this case need not be automatically im *54 posed whenever an economic striker is discharged before being permanently replaced. Although the Court's opinion speaks only of permanent replacement as a justification for refusal to reinstate an economic striker, the Court has recognized in the past that, in addition to permanent replacement, other “legitimate and substantial business justifications” for not reinstating an economic striker may exist. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U. S. 375, 378-380 (1967). The Court is not faced in the present case with other “legitimate and substantial business justifications” because the employer, who bears the burden of proof, asserted only the permanent-replacement justification. The finding of an unfair labor practice here is not to be read, therefore, as necessarily precluding an employer from reliance on appropriate justifications other than permanent replacement.
Since the employer failed to show any business justification arising before the discharges, these workers enjoyed reinstatement rights when they were discrimina-torily discharged. I concur in the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment because preservation of the rights existing before the workers were discharged is the appropriate remedy to provide “a restoration of the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal discrimination.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941).