holding that minimum requirements of due process in parole revocation proceeding include “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole”
How later courts described this case
- holding that minimum requirements of due process in parole revocation proceeding include “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole”
- explaining that “the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution, and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations” and that “[Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”; holding that this loss of liberty requires that the parolee be accorded certain due process protections, but not the full panoply of constitutional protections available in a criminal trial
- holding that the minimum requirements of due process for parole revocation hearings are: (i) notice of the claimed violations; (ii) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (iii) an opportunity to be heard in person and present evidence; (iv) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him; (v) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (vi) a written statement of the reasons for revoking parole
- recognizing that “the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations” which “deprive[] an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled implicitly by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
See United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir.2006) (rejecting defendant's argument that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), overruled Morrissey and Gagnon and finding that any right to confront witnesses at a probation hearing is rooted in due process, not the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in a criminal trial).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Clarence Haley v. Kintock Group, 587 F. App'x 1 (2014)
Thus, the facts in Morrissey are easily distinguishable from Haley’s situation.' Whereas Morrissey could spend his day as he saw fit, maintain employment, live with family and commingle with friends — in other words, “liv[e] a relatively normal life,” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593 — Haley was subject to strict rules governing his daily life.
Distinguished by In re Parole of Hill, 298 Mich. App. 404 (2012)
Thus, Morrissey, 408 US at *415 480, and Gagnon, 411 US at 778, are inapposite.
Distinguished by Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)
Morrissey itself does not cast doubt on today’s holding given that the liberty at issue in that ease— the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to a hearing before revocation of parole — invokes wholly different analysis than the search at issue here.
Distinguished by People ex rel. Nance v. New York State Board of Parole, 53 A.D.2d 739 (1976)
Finally, Morrissey is inapplicable to the instant appeal since petitioner was declared delinquent on December 27, 1970 and was returned to prison on September 30, 1971 which was before the decision in Morrissey.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins, concurring in the result.
I agree that a parole may not be revoked, consistently with the Due Process Clause, unless the parolee is afforded, first, a preliminary hearing at the time of arrest to determine whether there is probable cause to believe *491 that he has violated his parole conditions and, second, a final hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether he has, in fact, violated those conditions and whether his parole should be revoked. For each hearing the parolee is entitled to notice of the violations alleged and the evidence against him, opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless it is specifically found that a witness would thereby be exposed to a significant risk of harm. Moreover, in each case the decisionmaker must be impartial, there must be some record of the proceedings, and the decisionmaker’s conclusions must be set forth in written form indicating both the evidence and the reasons relied upon. Because the Due Process Clause requires these procedures, I agree that the case must be remanded as the Court orders.
The Court, however, states that it does not now decide whether the parolee is also entitled at each hearing to the assistance of retained counsel or of appointed counsel if he is indigent. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), nonetheless plainly dictates that he at least “must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires.” Id., at 270 . As the Court said there, “Counsel can help delineate the issues, present the factual contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-examination, and generally safeguard the interests of” his client. Id., at 270-271 . The only question open under our precedents is whether counsel must be furnished the parolee if he is indigent.