holding that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel [because] ‘the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or “petty” matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.’ ” (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970))
How later courts described this case
- holding that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented by counsel [because] ‘the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or “petty” matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.’ ” (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970))
- recognizing that “[t]he Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations has been made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment” and extending its breadth to any cases in which “actual deprivation of a person’s liberty” is at stake
- holding that under Sixth Amendment, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he had or waived counsel
- holding that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned - 31 - for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Colson v. State, 1985 Me. LEXIS 852 (1985)
The logic of the Argersinger opinion is inapplicable to the narrow confines of a “show cause” hearing under § 1304.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in the result.
I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of the Court and with Mr. Justice Powell’s appraisal of the problems. Were I able to confine my focus solely to the burden that the States will have to bear in providing counsel,. I would be inclined, at this stage of the development of the constitutional right to counsel, to conclude that there is much to commend drawing the line at penalties in excess of six months’ confinement. Yet several cogent factors suggest the infirmities in any approach that allows confinement for any period without the aid of counsel at trial; any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter. The issu’es that must be dealt with in a trial for a petty offense'or a misdemeanor may often be simpler than those involved in a felony trial and yét be beyond the capability, of a layman, especially when he is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There is little ground, therefore, to assume that a defendant, unaided by counsel, will be any more able adequately to defend himself against the lesser charges that may inyolve confinement than more serious charges. Appeal from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely to be of much help to.a defendant since the die is usually cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial record.
*42 Trial judges sitting in petty and misdemeanor cases— and prosecutors — should recognize exactly what will be required by today’s decision. Because no individual can be imprisoned unless he is represented by counsel, the triah judge and the prosecutor will have to engage in a .predictive .evaluation of each case to determine whether there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail term. .The judge can preserve the option of a jail sentence only by offering counsel to any defendant unable to retain counsel on his own. This need to predict will place a new load on courts already overburdened and already compelled to deal with far more cases in one day than is reasonable and proper. Yet the pre-' diction is not one beyond the capacity of an experienced judge, aided as he should be by the prosecuting officer. As to jury cases, the latter should be prepared to inform the judge’as to any prior record of the accused, the general nature of the case against the accused, including any use of violence, the severity of harm to the victim, the impact on the community, and the other factors relevant to the sentencing process. Since the judge ought to have some degree of such information after judgment of guilt is determined, ways can be found in the more, serious misdemeanor cases^ when jury trial is not waived to make it available to the judge before trial. * This will not mean a full “presentence” report on every defendant in every case before the jury passes on guilt, but a prosecutor should know. before trial whether he intends to urge a jail sentence, - and. if he does he should be prepared to aid the court with the factual and legal basis for his view on that score.
*43 This will mean not only that more defense counsel must be provided, but also additional prosecutors and better facilities for securing information about the accused as it bears ón .the probability of a decision to confine.
The step we take today should cause no surprise to the. legal profession. More than five years ago the profession, speaking through the American Bar Association in a Report on Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, determined that society’s goal should be “that the system for providing counsel and facilities for the defense be as good as the system which society provides for the prosecution.” American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services 1 (Approved Draft 1968). The ABA was not addressing itelf, as we must in this case, to the constitutional requirement but only to the broad policy issue. Elsewhere in the Report the ABA stated that:
“The fundamental premise of these standards is that representation by counsel is desirable in criminal cases both from the viewpoint of the defendant and of society.” Id., at 3. .
After considering the same general factors involved in the issue we decidé today, the ABA Report specifically concluded that:
“Counsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty, except those types, of offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed, regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or otherwise.” Id., § 4.1, pp. 37-38. .
In a companion ABA Report on Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function *44 the same basic theme appears in the positive standard cast in these terms:
“Counsel, for the accused is an essential component of the administration of criminal justice. A court properly constituted to hear a criminal ca^e must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel for the accused.” Id., at 153 (Approved Draft .1968).
The right to counsel has historically been an evolving concept. The constitutional' requirements with respect to the issue have dated in recent times from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), to Gideon v. Wainwright; 372 U. S. 335 .(1963). Part of this evolution has been, expressed in the policy prescriptions of the legal profession itself, and the contributions' of the organized bar and individual lawyers — such as those appointed to represent the indigent defendants in the, Powell and Gideon cases — have been notable. The holding of the Court today may well add large new burdens on a profession already overtaxéd, but the, dynamics of the profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed on it.
In a nonjüry case the prior record of the accused should not be made known to the trier of fact except by way of traditional impeachment.