concluding that a police station showup conducted after defendant's arrest, but before the initiation of any adversary criminal proceeding — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment — is not a criminal prosecution at which the accused, as a matter of absolute right, is entitled to counsel
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a police station showup conducted after defendant's arrest, but before the initiation of any adversary criminal proceeding — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment — is not a criminal prosecution at which the accused, as a matter of absolute right, is entitled to counsel
- holding that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated in a lineup as the privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature
- holding that a lineup conducted after a defendant's arrest, but before arraignment, indictment, or formal charges is merely investigatory in nature; therefore, the defendant is not entitled to presence of counsel at such a lineup
- stating that the Sixth Amendment right to coun- sel attaches upon "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings--whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Ferrer, 842 F. Supp. 40 (1994)
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), is inapposite to the case at hand because the lineup in Kirby was conducted before formal charges were filed.
Distinguished by State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140 (1983)
The Bank argues that Escobedo and Kirby are distinguishable because they pertain to the right to have counsel present, not the right to place a phone call to counsel.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring in the result.
As I would not extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule, I concur in the result reached by the Court.