explaining that there is no Fourth Amendment violation when a householder “acqui- esce[s]” to a search warrant because “there is lawful authority independent of the will of the householder who might, other things being equal, prefer no search at all”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that there is no Fourth Amendment violation when a householder “acqui- esce[s]” to a search warrant because “there is lawful authority independent of the will of the householder who might, other things being equal, prefer no search at all”
- finding warrantless inspection of weapons dealers “crucial” to the regulatory scheme since it ensured “weapons [were] distributed through regular channels and in a traceable manner and ma[de] possible the prevention of sales to undesirable customers and the detection of the origin of particular firearms”
- noting that “[w]hen a [firearms] dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection”
- holding that when a person engages in a “pervasively regulated business ... he does so with the knowledge that his business ... will be subject to effective inspection.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hogge v. Hedrick, 391 F. Supp. 91 (1975)
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972), cited by defendants, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blacicmun,
concurring in the result.
Had I been a member of the Court when Colonnade Catering Cory. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970), was decided, I would have joined the respective dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black and of The Chief Justice, 397 U. S., at 79 and 77. I therefore concur in the result here.