holding that dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits following the death of their father, the same as legitimate children
How later courts described this case
- holding that dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children are entitled to workers’ compensation benefits following the death of their father, the same as legitimate children
- “Opening the courts to suits [by the mother of an illegitimate child] may conceivably be a temptation to some to assert motherhood fraudulently”
- holding that state cannot deny unacknowledged illegitimate children recovery under workmen’s compensation statute while allowing recovery to legitimate children
- holding that penalizing the illegitimate child for the acts of the parent is an unconstitutional and ineffective deterrent and does not serve any state interest
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hippensteel v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 72 Pa. Commw. 261 (1983)
We also note .that the reference to Weber is inapposite in the instant circumstances.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
For me, La. Civ. Code, Art. 204, is the provision in the State’s statutory structure that proves fatal for this workmen’s compensation case under the focus of constitutional measurement. The Article operated to deny Henry Stokes the ability even to acknowledge his illegitimates so that they might qualify as children within the definition provided by La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1021 (3). This is so because the decedent (inasmuch as he was then married to Adlay Jones Stokes and remained married to her the rest of his life) and the mother were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception and thereafter. This bar, indeed, under the Court’s decided cases, denied equal protection to the illegitimates. Cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, 539 (1971).
I thus give primary emphasis to the presence of Art. 204 and, I believe, far more emphasis than does the Court. If that statute did not exist or were inapplicable, the case might be a different one. While the Court refers to Art. 204, and to a degree relies upon it, ante, at 171 n. 9, it seems to me that it does so only secondarily. I read the opinion as flatly granting dependent unacknowledged illegitimate children full equality with dependent legitimate children and therefore as striking down the Lou *177 isiana statutory scheme even for the situation where the father has the power to acknowledge his illegitimates but refrains from doing so. In other words, the Court holds the Louisiana system unconstitutional with respect to illegitimate dependent children wholly apart from the barrier of Art. 204. Certainly, the first paragraph of the opinion is to this effect.
In deciding this case, I need not, and would not, go that far. I would let the resolution of that issue await its appropriate presentation.