stating that, if Section 1 of the Sherman Act were “to be read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to violate it” since “[t]heoretically, all manufacturers, distributors, merchants, sellers, and buyers could be considered as potential competitors of each other”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, if Section 1 of the Sherman Act were “to be read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to violate it” since “[t]heoretically, all manufacturers, distributors, merchants, sellers, and buyers could be considered as potential competitors of each other”
- explaining that "the freedom to compete ... cannot be foreclosed with respect to one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the economy”
- holding that “[bjorizontal territorial limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition” and are “per se violations of the Sherman Act”
- holding that “an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition” is a per se violation
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (1978)
Defendants contend that Sealey and the similar holding in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 92 S.Ct. 1126, 31 L.Ed.2d 515 (1972) are inapposite since the area franchisees do not own or control BRICO and it is BRICO that makes the territorial allocations.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
The conclusion the Court reaches has its anomalous aspects, for surely, as the District Court’s findings make clear, today’s decision in the Government’s favor will tend to stultify Topeo members’ competition with the great and larger chains. The bigs, therefore, should find it easier to get bigger and, as a consequence, reality *613 seems at odds with the public interest. The per se rule, however, now appears to be so firmly established by the Court that, at this late date, I could not oppose it. Relief, if any is to be forthcoming, apparently must be by way of legislation.