holding that Secretary of Labor did not adequately represent a union member even though they shared litigation objective because the Secretary “ha[d] an obligation to protect the ‘vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union member.’” (quoted source omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that Secretary of Labor did not adequately represent a union member even though they shared litigation objective because the Secretary “ha[d] an obligation to protect the ‘vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union member.’” (quoted source omitted)
- holding that a union member’s interest was not adequately represented by the Secretary of Labor because the Secretary had a “duty to serve two distinct interests, which are related, but not identical:” that of the individual union member and that of'the general public
- concluding that "sufficient doubt about the adequacy of representation [existed] to warrant intervention” by a union member where the Secretary of Labor had two distinct, “related, but not identical” duties—to serve union members and to protect the public interest
- finding a statute forbidding a particular party from bringing a cause of action may only be read to prohibit intervention by that party if intervention would frustrate Congress’s reasons for barring that party from initiating the litigation in the first place
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Company, 732 F.2d 452 (1984)
Appellants, relying on Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 92 S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972), urge that the foregoing principles are inapplicable to intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), because Trbovich authorized intervention under circumstances where the intervenor could not have initiated the suit.
Distinguished by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 646 (1983)
Thus Trbovich is distinguishable from the instant case where the interest of the applicant and existing plaintiff are precisely identical.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in part.
I join the opinion of the Court to the extent that it holds that Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act does not bar intervention by union members, pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a), in suits initiated by the Secretary of Labor challenging union elections. I differ from the majority, however, in that I would also permit the union members in this case to raise their additional *540 grounds * for setting aside the disputed election. In my view, the limited intervention granted by the majority serves neither the purpose of the liberalizing 1966 amendments to Rule 24, nor the twin purposes of Title IV— to preserve unions from a multiplicity of frivolous election challenges, and also to centralize in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with respect to a single election.
Here, the Secretary has served his screening function. He has decided that petitioner’s election challenge is meritorious. The Court concedes, moreover, that the burden on the union to defend against the additional claims would not be particularly burdensome, compared to the onus of an independent action. Ante, at 537. These claims relate squarely to the election whose legality the union must defend. I would permit them to be heard.
These claims both related to alleged manipulation of pensioners by the incumbents. One claim attacked so-called “bogus” locals, composed entirely of pensioners,, which were “run” by the incumbents. The second claim was that the union president attempted improperly to influence the pensioners’ vote by arranging for increased pension benefits just before the election.