concluding that “it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors”
- holding that a party has a right of petition protected by the First Amendment to access agencies and courts challenging applications sought by a competitor; whether that petitioning activity would ultimately be shown to violate antitrust laws as "sham" petitioning remained to be established
- recognizing that the First Amendment right to petition extends to petitioning “administrative agencies ... and to courts”
- recognizing that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies outside the antitrust context to lawsuits that allege a violation of the Fair Housing Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by a later decision, 700 F.2d 785 (1983)
The Court held that where "the administrative and judicial processes [are] abused," 404 U.S. at 513, 92 S.Ct. at 613, in an attempt to stifle competition, Noerr-Pennington is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 1061 (1981)
404 U.S. 508, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1971), is inapplicable here.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
concurring in the judgment.
In the Noerr case 1 this Court held, in a unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, that a conspiracy by railroads to influence legislative and executive action in order to destroy the competition of truckers in the long-haul freight business was wholly immune from the antitrust laws. 2 This conclusion, we held, was required in order to preserve the informed operation of governmental processes and to protect the right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment. 3 Today the Court retreats from Noerr, and in the process tramples upon important First Amendment values. For that reason I cannot join the Court’s opinion.
In Noerr the defendants were joined together in an effort to induce legislative and executive action. Here, *517 so the complaint alleges, the defendants (petitioners) have joined to induce administrative and judicial action. The difference in type of governmental body might make a difference in the applicability of the antitrust laws if the petitioners had made misrepresentations of fact or law to these tribunals, or had engaged in perjury, or fraud, or bribery. 4 But, contrary to implications in the Court’s opinion, there are in this case no allegations whatever of any such conduct on the part of the petitioners. And, in the absence of such conduct, I can see no difference, so far as the antitrust laws and the First Amendment are concerned, between trying to influence executive and legislative bodies and trying to influence administrative and judicial bodies. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U. S. 1 ; United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 ; United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U. S. 576 .
The Court concedes that the petitioners’ “right of access to the agencies and courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers ... is part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment.” Yet, says the Court, their joint agreement to exercise that right “does not necessarily give them immunity from the antitrust laws.” Ante, at 513. It is difficult to imagine a statement more totally at odds with Noerr. For what that case explicitly held is that the joint exercise of the constitutional right of petition is given immunity from the antitrust laws.
While disagreeing with the Court’s opinion, I would *518 nonetheless remand this case to the District Court for trial. The complaint contains allegations that the petitioners have:
1. Agreed jointly to finance and to carry out and publicize a consistent, systematic and uninterrupted program of opposing ‘with or without probable cause and regardless of the merits’ every application, with insignificant exceptions, for additional operating rights or for the registration or transfer of operating rights, before the California PUC, the ICC, and the courts on appeal.
2. Carried out such agreement (a) by appearing as protestants in all proceedings instituted by plaintiffs and others in like position or by instituting complaints in opposition to applications or transfers or registrations; (b) by establishing a trust fund to finance the foregoing, consisting of contributions monthly in amounts proportionate to each defendant’s annual gross income; (c) by publicizing and making known to plaintiffs and others in like position the foregoing program.
Under these allegations, liberally construed, the respondents are entitled to prove that the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke the processes of the administrative agencies and courts, but to discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking those processes. Such an intent would make the conspiracy “an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.” Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U. S., at 144.
It is only on this basis that I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U. S. 127 .
See also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 669-671 .
This conclusion, the Court held, was a corollary of our decisions in United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533 , and Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 , holding that when a monopoly or restraint of trade is the result of valid governmental action, there cannot be an antitrust violation.
In Noerr, the Court emphasized that the defendants’ “unethical” conduct did not affect their antitrust immunity for jointly exerting pressure on the Legislative and Executive Branches, 365 U. S., at 141 . See, however, Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172 .