recognizing 26 that plea bargaining “is an essential component of the administration of justice” in 27 supporting “prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases,” avoiding 14 1 “the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre[]trial confinement,” protecting 2 “the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct 3 even while on pretrial release,” and enhancing “the rehabilitative prospects of the 4 guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned” by “shortening the time between the 5 charge and [the] disposition”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing 26 that plea bargaining “is an essential component of the administration of justice” in 27 supporting “prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases,” avoiding 14 1 “the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre[]trial confinement,” protecting 2 “the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct 3 even while on pretrial release,” and enhancing “the rehabilitative prospects of the 4 guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned” by “shortening the time between the 5 charge and [the] disposition”
- recognizing that plea bargaining “is an essential component of the administration of justice” in supporting “prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases,” avoiding “the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre[]trial confinement,” protecting “the public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release,” and enhancing “the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned” by “shortening the time between the charge and [the] disposition”
- holding that whether or not the prosecutor’s conduct actually influenced the judge’s decision or not, “the interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration”
- finding that where a defendant fulfills his promise in entering into a guilty plea, the prosecution is bound to fulfill any promise made in exchange, in order to insure the “fairness” of the plea bargaining process which has come to be known as an essential and desirable practice in the administration of criminal justice
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Rubenstein, 228 F. Supp. 3d 223 (2017)
Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495. Santobello is inapposite because, first, there was a breach of the agreement in Santobello, whereas there was no such breach of the Agreement here.
Distinguished by Diggs v. State, 93 Ark. App. 332 (2005)
Santobello, supra, is distinguishable in that there, the defendant had entered a plea to a reduced charge, and the trial court set the matter for sentencing at a later date.
Distinguished by Miles v. State, 350 Ark. 243 (2002)
Thus, Santobello v. New York, supra, is inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Husband, 748 F. Supp. 476 (1989)
Santobello is clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart join,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with much of the majority’s opinion, but conclude that petitioner must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. This is the relief petitioner requested, and, on the facts set out by the majority, it is a form of relief to which he is entitled.
There is no need to belabor the fact that the Constitution guarantees to all criminal defendants the right to a trial by judge or jury, or, put another way, the “right not to plead guilty,” United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 581 (1968). This and other federal-rights may be waived through a guilty plea, but such waivers are not lightly presumed and, in fact, are viewed with the “utmost solicitude.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969). Given this, I believe that where the defendant presents a reason for vacating his plea and the government has not relied on the plea to its disadvantage, *268 the plea may be vacated and the right to trial regained, at least where the motion to vacate is made prior to sentence and judgment. In other words, in such circumstances I would not deem the earlier plea to have irrevocably waived the defendant’s federal constitutional right to a trial.
Here, petitioner never claimed any automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing. Rather, he tendered a specific reason why, in his case, the plea should be vacated. His reason was that the prosecutor had broken a promise made in return for the agreement to plead guilty. When a prosecutor breaks the bargain, he undercuts the basis for the waiver of constitutional rights implicit in the plea. This, it seems to me, provides the defendant ample justification for rescinding the plea. Where a promise is “unfulfilled,” Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 755 (1970), specifically denies that the plea “must stand.” Of course, where the prosecutor has broken the plea agreement, it may be appropriate to permit the defendant to enforce the plea bargain. But that is not the remedy sought here. * Rather, it seems to me that a breach of the plea bargain provides ample reason to permit the plea to be vacated.
It is worth noting that in the ordinary case where a motion to vacate is made prior to sentencing, the government has taken no action in reliance on the previously entered guilty plea and would suffer no harm from the plea’s withdrawal. More pointedly, here the State claims no such harm beyond disappointed expec *269 tations about the plea itself. At least where the government itself has broken the plea bargain, this disappointment cannot bar petitioner from withdrawing his guilty plea and reclaiming his right to a trial.
I would remand the case with instructions that the plea be vacated and petitioner given an opportunity to replead to the original charges in the indictment.
Mr. Justice Douglas, although joining the Court's opinion (apparently because he thinks the remedy should be chosen by the state court), concludes that the state court “ought to accord a defendant’s preference considerable, if not controlling, weight.” Thus, a majority of the Court appears to believe that in cases like these, when the defendant seeks to vacate the plea, that relief should generally be granted.