finding that national security is a sufficient interest only where there is "governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea”
How later courts described this case
- finding that national security is a sufficient interest only where there is "governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea”
- holding that the federal government was not entitled to an injunction preventing the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing' the “Pentagon Papers,” which were classified at the time that they were obtained by the newspapers
- holding that the Motion Picture Control Act was a prior restraint when the Board of Censors had to approve movies before screening
- holding that “neither the CIA’s administrative determination nor any court order in this case constitutes a prior restraint in the traditional sense upon [the plaintiff] or any other party”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
So clear are the constitutional limitations on prior restraint against expression, that from the time of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), until recently in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415 (1971), we have had little occasion to be concerned with cases involving prior restraints against news reporting on matters of public interest. There is, therefore, little variation among the members of the Court in terms of resistance to prior restraints against publication. Adherence to this basic -constitutional principle, however, does not make these cases simple. In these cases, the' imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive. Only those who view the First Amendment as an absolute in all circumstances — a view I respect, but reject — can find such cases as these to be simple or easy.
These cases are not simple for another and more immediate reason. We do not know the facts of the cases. No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew all the facts. No member of this Court knows all the facts.
Why are we in this posture, in which only those judges to whom the First Amendment is absolute and permits of no restraint in any circumstances or for any reason, are really in a position to act?
I suggest we are in this posture because these cases have been conducted in unseemly haste. Mr. Justice Harlan covers the chronology of events demonstrating the hectic pressures under which these cases have been processed and I need not restate them. The prompt *749 setting of these cases reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint. But prompt judicial action does not mean unjudicial haste.
Here, moreover, the frenetic haste is due in large part to the manner in which the Times proceeded from the date it obtained the purloined documents. It seems reasonably clear now that the haste precluded reasonable and deliberate judicial treatment of these cases and was not warranted. The precipitate action of this Court aborting trials not yet completed is not the kind of judicial conduct that’ ought to attend the disposition of a great issue.
The newspapers make a derivative claim under the First Amendment; they denominate this right as the pubiic “right to know”; by implication, the Times asserts a sole trusteeship of that right by virtue of its journalistic “scoop.” The right is asserted as an absolute. Of course, the First Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out in his aphorism concerning the right to shout “fire” in a crowded theater if there was no fire. There are other exceptions, some of which Chief Justice Hughes mentioned by way of example in Near v. Minnesota . There are no doubt other exceptions no one has had occasion to describe or discuss. Conceivably such exceptions may be lurking in these cases and would have been flushed had they been properly considered in the trial courts, free from unwarranted deadlines and frenetic pressures. An issue of this importance should be tried and heard in a judicial atmosphere conducive , to thoughtful, reflective deliberation, especially when haste, in terms of hours, is unwarranted in light of the long period the Times, by its own choice, deferred publication. 1
*750 It is not- disputed that the Times has had unauthorized possession of the documents for three to four months, during which it has had its expert analysts studying them, presumably digesting them and preparing the material for publication. During all of this time, the Times, presumably in its capacity as- trustee of the public’s “right to know,” has held up publication for purposes it considered proper and thus public knowledge was delayed. No doubt this was for a good reason; thé analysis of 7,000 pages of complex material drawn from a vastly greater volume of material would inevitably take time and the writing of good news stories takes time. But why should the United States Government, from whom this information was illegally acquired by someone, along with all the counsel, trial judges, and appellate judges be placed under needless pressure? After these months of deferral, the alleged “right to know” has somehow and suddenly become a right that must be vindicated instanter.
Would it have been unreasonable, since the newspaper could anticipate the Government’s objections to release of secret material, to give the Government an opportunity to review the entire collection and determine whether agreement could be reached on publication? Stolen or not, if security was not in fact jeopardized, much of the material could no doubt have been declassified, since it spans a period ending in 1968. With such an approach— one that great newspapers have in the past practiced and stated editorially to be the duty of an honorable press— the newspapers and Government might well have nar-
*753 real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.”
With all respect, I consider that the Court has been .almost irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases.
Both the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rendered judgment on June 23. The New York Times’ petition for certiorari, its motion for accelerated consideration thereof, and its application for interim relief were filed in this Court on June 24 at about 11 a. m. The application of the United States for interim relief in the Post case was also filed here on June 24 at about 7:15 p. m. This Court’s order setting a hearing before us on June 26 at 11 a. m., a course which I joined only to avoid the possibility of even more peremptory action by the Coürt, was issued less than 24 hours before. The record in th.e Post case was filed with the Clerk shortly before 1 p. m. on Juné 25; the record in the Times case did not arrive until 7 or 8 o’clock that same night. The briefs of the parties were received less than two hours before argument on June 26.
This frenzied train of events took place in the name of the presumption against prior restraints created by the First Amendment. Due regard for the extraordinarily important and difficult questions involved in. these litigations should have led the' Court to shun such a precipitate timetable. In order to decide the merits of these cases properly, some or all of the following questions should have been faced:
1. Whether the Attorney General is authorized to bring these suits in the name of the United States. Com *754 pare In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895), with Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). This question involves as well the construction and validity of a singularly opaque statute — the Espionage Act, 18 U. S. C. § 793 (e).
2. Whether the First Amendment permits the federal courts to enjoin publication of stories which would present a serious threat to national security. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum).
3. Whether the threat to publish highly secret documents is of itself a sufficient implication of national security to justify an injunction on the theory that regardless of the contents of the documents harm enough results simply from the demonstration of such a breach of secrecy.
4. Whether the unauthorized disclosure of any of these particular documents would seriously impair the national security.
5. What weight should be given to the opinion of high officers in the Executive Branch of the Government with respect to questions 3 and 4.
6. .Whether the newspapers are entitled to retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents, or the originals of which they are duplicates, were purloined from the Government’s possession and that the newspapers'received them with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired. Cf. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 129 U. S. App. D. C. 74, 390 F. 2d 489 (1967, amended 1968).
7. Whether the threatened harm to the national security or the Government’s, possessory interest in the documents t justifies the issuance of an injunction against publication in light of—
a. The strong First Amendment policy against prior restraints on publication;
*755 b. The doctrine against enjoining conduct in.violation of criminal statutes; and
c. The extent to which the materials at issue have apparently already been otherwise disseminated.
These are difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment; the potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time which has been available to us, to the lower courts, * and to the parties has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of consideration they deserve. It is a reflection on the stability of the judicial, process that these, great issues— as. important as any that have arisen during my time on the Court — should have been decided under the pressures engendered by the torrent of publicity that has attended these litigations from their inception.
Forced as I am to reach the merits of these cases, I dissent from the opinion and judgments of the Court. Within the severe limitations imposed by the tiftie- constraints under which I have been required to operate, I can only state my reasons in telescoped form, even though in different circumstances I would have felt .constrained to deal with the cases in the. fuller sweep indicated above.
It is a sufficient basis for affirming the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Times litigation to observe that its order must rest on the conclusion that because of the time elements the Government had not been given an adequate opportunity to present its case *756 to the District Court. At the least this conclusion was not an abuse of. discretion.
In the Post litigation the Government had more time to prepare; this was apparently the basis for the refusal of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on rehearing to conform its judgment to that of the Second Circuit. But I think there is another and more fundamental reason why this judgment cannot stand — a reason which also furnishes an additional ground for not reinstating the judgment of the District Court in the Times litigation, set aside by the Court of Appeals. It is plain to me that the scope of the judicial function in passing upon the activities of the Executive Branch of the Government in the field of foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is, I think, dictated by the concept of separation of powers upon which our constitutional system rests.
In a speech on the floor of the House of Representa-tiyes, Chief Justice John Marshall, then a member of that body, stated:
“The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.” 10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800)..
Erom that time, shortly after the founding of the Nation, to this, there has been no substantial challenge to this description of the scope of executive power. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319-321 (1936), collecting authorities.
Prom this constitutional primacy in the field of foreign affairs, it seems to me that certain conclusions necessarily follow. Some of these were stated concisely by . President Washington, declining the request of the House of Representatives for the papers leading up to the negotiation of the .Jay Treaty:
“The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; *757 and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or con-, templated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate ' inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in .relation to other powers.” 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 194-195 (1896).
The power to evaluate the “pernicious influence” of premature disclosure is not, however, lodged in . the Executive alone. I agree that, in performance of its duty to protect the values of the First Amendment against political pressures, the judiciary must review the initial Executive determination to the point of satisfying itself that the subject matter of the dispute does lie within the proper compass of the President’s foreign relations power. Constitutional considerations forbid “a complete abandonment of judicial control.” Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 8 (1953). Moreover, the judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security be made by the head of' the Executive Department concerned — here the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense — after actual personal consideration by that officer. This safeguard is required in the analogous area of executive claims of privilege for secrets of state. See id., at 8 and n. 20; Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A. C. 624, 638 (House of Lords).
But in my judgment the judiciary may not properly go beyond these two inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national security.
“[T]he véry nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such de *758 cisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the' government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve, large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 111 (1948) (Jackson, J.). -
Even if there is some room for the judiciary to override the executive determination, it is. plain that the scope of review must be exceedingly narrow. I can see no indication in the opinions of either the District Court or the Court of Appeals in the Post litigation that the conclusions of the Executive were given even the deference owing to an administrative agency, much less that owing to a co-equal branch of the Government operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative.
Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the Court. of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on this ground and- remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court. Before the commencement of such further proceedings, due opportunity should be afforded the Government for procuring from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense or both an expression of their views .on the issue of national security. The ensuing review by- the District Court should be in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. And for the reasons stated above I would affirm the judgment of the Couri of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Pending further hearings in each case conducted under the appropriate ground rúles, I would continue the *759 restraints on publication. I cannot believe that the doctrine prohibiting prior restraints reaches to the point of preventing courts from maintaining, the status quo long enough to act responsibly in matters of such national importance as those involved here.
As noted elsewhere the Times conducted its analysis of the 47 volumes of Government documents over a period of several months and did so with a degree of security that a government might envy. Such security was essential, of course, to protect the enterprise *750 from others. Meanwhile the Times has copyrighted its material and there were strong intimations in the oral argument that the Times contemplated enjoining its use by any other publisher in violation of its copyright. Paradoxically this would afford it a protection, analogous to prior restraint, against all others — a protection the Times denies the Government of the United States.
The hearing in the Post case before Judge Gesell began at 8 a. m. on June 21, and his decision was rendered, under the hammer of a deadline imposed by the Court of Appeals, shortly before 5 p. m. on the same day. The hearing in the Times case before Judge Gur-fein was held on June 18 and his decision was rendered on June 19. The Government’s appeals in the two cases were heard by the Courts of Appeals for . the District of Columbia and Second Circuits, each court sitting en banc, on June 22.- Each.court rendered its decision on the following afternoon.