determining that a § 1985(3) plaintiff must show that “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators’ action” and specifically "declining to determine whether § 1985(3)'s protection extends to non-racially-motivated conspiracies
How later courts described this case
- determining that a § 1985(3) plaintiff must show that “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators’ action” and specifically "declining to determine whether § 1985(3)'s protection extends to non-racially-motivated conspiracies
- holding that there must be “some racial, or *458 perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all.”
- explaining-in the context of section 1985(3) — that the “language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges or immunities, means that there must be some .,, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action,”
- explaining that Section 1985(3) creates a statutory cause of action for “victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving [the victim] of the basic rights that the law secures to all free [people]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Mayer v. Wedgewood Neighborhood Coalition, 707 F.2d 1020 (1983)
Id. While Reichardt did not reach the question of congressional power to reach the conspiracy alleged in that case, id. at 505-06, and Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), limited its holding to conspiracies in violation of the thirteenth amendment, id. at 104-05, 91 S.Ct. at 1799-1800, the Court suggested that section 1985(3) could also reach conspiracies based on "otherwise cl…
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gill v. Farm Bureau Life Insurance, 906 F.2d 1265 (1990)
It seems clear that the Griffin limitation is inapplicable in the case at bar, though Gill makes a colorable effort to comply with it by saying that the insurance companies wanted to "send a message” to other agents.
The opinion
Mb. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
T agree with the Court’s opinion, except that I find it unnecessary to rely on the “right of interstate travel” as a premise for justifying federal jurisdiction under •§ 1985 (3). With that reservation, I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.