Coates v. City of Cincinnati

Mr. Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.

The claim in this case, in part, is that the Cincinnati ordinance is so vague that it may not constitutionally *618 be applied to any conduct. But the ordinance prohibits persons from assembling with others and “conduct[ing] themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by ....” Cincinnati Code of Ordinances § 901-L6. Any man of average comprehension should know that some kinds of conduct, such as assault or blocking passage on the street, will annoy others and are clearly covered by the “annoying conduct” standard of the ordinance. It would be frivolous to say that these and many other kinds of conduct are not within the foreseeable reach of the law.

It is possible that a whole range of other acts, defined with unconstitutional imprecision, is forbidden by the ordinance. But as a general rule, when a criminal charge is based on conduct constitutionally subject to proscription and clearly forbidden by a statute, it is no defense that the law would be unconstitutionally vague if applied to other behavior. Such a statute is not vague on its face. It may be vague as applied in some circumstances, but ruling on such a challenge obviously requires knowledge of the conduct with which a defendant is charged.

In Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97 (1951), a police officer was charged under federal statutes with extracting confessions by force and thus, under color of law, depriving the prisoner thére involved of rights, privileges, and immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, contrary to 18 U. S. C. § 242 . The defendant there urged that the standard — rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution — was impermissibly vague and, more particularly, that the Court was often so closely divided on illegal-confession issues that no defendant could be expected to know when he was violating the law. The Court’s response was that, while application of the stat *619 ute to less obvious methods of coercion might raise doubts about the adequacy of the standard of guilt, in the case before it, it was “plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would not be allowed in evidence whatever the school of thought concerning the scope and meaning of the Due Process Clause.” Id., at 101 . The claim of facial vagueness was thus rejected.

So too in United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U. S. 29 (1963), where we considered a statute forbidding sales of goods at “unreasonably” low prices to injure or eliminate a competitor, 15 U. S. C. § 13a, we thought the statute gave a seller adequate notice that sales below cost were illegal. The statute was therefore not facially vague, although it might be difficult to tell whether certain other kinds of conduct fell within this language. We said: “In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged.” Id., at 33. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612 (1954). This approach is consistent with the host of cases holding that “one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.” United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960), and cases there cited.

Our cases, however, including National Dairy, recognize a different approach where the statute at issue purports to regulate or proscribe rights of speech or press protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951). Although a statute may be neither vague, overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct charged against a particular defendant, he is *620 permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient in one of these respects, it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the statute. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 491-492 (1965). The statute, in effect, is stricken down on its face. This result is deemed justified since the otherwise continued existence of the statute in unnarrowed form would tend to suppress constitutionally protected rights. See United States v. National Dairy Corp., supra, at 36.

Even accepting the overbreadth doctrine with respect to statutes clearly reaching speech, the Cincinnati ordinance does not purport to bar or regulate speech as such. It prohibits persons from assembling and “conduct [ing]” themselves in a manner annoying to other persons. Even if the assembled defendants in this case were demonstrating and picketing, we have long recognized that picketing is not solely a communicative endeavor and has aspects which the State is entitled to regulate even though there is incidental impact on speech. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559 (1965), the Court held valid on its face a statute forbidding picketing and parading near a courthouse. This was deemed a valid regulation of conduct rather than pure speech. The conduct reached by the statute was “subject to regulation even though [it was] intertwined with expression and association.” Id., at 563 . The Court then went on to consider the statute as applied to the facts of record.

In the case before us, I would deal with the Cincinnati ordinance as we would with the ordinary criminal statute. The ordinance clearly reaches certain conduct but may be illegally vague with respect to other conduct. The statute is not infirm on its face and since we have no information from this record as to what conduct was *621 charged against these defendants, we are in no position to judge the statute as applied. That the ordinance may confer wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances is irrelevant when we may be dealing with conduct at its core.

I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court.