explaining that an entity is a "political subdivision" under federal law if it is either "(1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an entity is a "political subdivision" under federal law if it is either "(1) created directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate"
- holding political subdivision exemption limited to entities either (1) created directly by state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of government, or (2) administered by individuals responsible to public officials or to general electorate
- stating that Congress intended to except “the labor relations of federal, state, and municipal governments, since governmental employees did not usually enjoy the right to strike” (citations omitted)
- finding that Respondent Utility District was a political subdivision subject to the exemption to jurisdiction under the National Labor Relations Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that federal, rather than state, law governs the determination of whether an employer is a “political subdivision” of the State within the meaning of § 2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2). But I cannot agree that the Board erred in this case in concluding that the respondent is not entitled to exemption under the Act.
In determining that the respondent Utility District was not a “political subdivision” of the State, the Board followed its settled policy of weighing all relevant factors, with particular emphasis here on the circumstances that the District is neither “created directly by the State” nor “administered by State-appointed or elected officials” and is “autonomous in the conduct of its day-to-day affairs.” On the other side, the Board gave less weight to the State’s characterization of a utility district as an arm of the State for purposes of exemption from state taxes and conferral of the power of eminent domain.
This approach seems wholly acceptable to me, inas *610 much as state tax exemption and the power of eminent domain are not attributes peculiar to political subdivisions nor attributes with any discernible impact on labor relations. Attributes which would implicate labor policy, such as the payment of wages out of public funds or restrictions upon the right of the employees to strike, are not present here.
The Court points to provisions that the records of the District be available for public inspection, and that the commissioners of the District hold hearings and make written findings. These factors are said to “betoken a state, rather than a private, instrumentality.” The question, however, is not whether the District is a state instrumentality, but whether it is a “political subdivision” of the State. And the provisions in question hardly go to that issue.
The Board’s reasonable construction of the Act is entitled to great weight and it is not our function to weigh the facts de novo and displace its evaluation with our own. The Board here has made a reasoned decision which does no violence to the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case with instructions to enforce the Board’s order.