stating that, although “a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions,” “it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, although “a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions,” “it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify”
- concluding that “the policies of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on guilt”
- noting that aggravating circum stances could have been part of offense but instead were used as post-conviction enhancement
- holding that "the threshold question is whether compelling the election [between constitutional rights] impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 159, expressly overruled).
Overruled on other grounds by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972)
. 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), overruled by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed.2d 765 (1972).
Overruled on other grounds by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971), overruled on other grounds, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 247
Overruled — as noted by a later court
The view, once prevalent, that the procedural requirements applicable to capital sentencing are no more rigorous than those governing noncapital sentencing decisions, see, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 217, 91 S.Ct. at 1472; Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 251-52, 69 S.Ct. at 1085, is no longer valid.
medium confidenceQuestioned by State Ex Rel. Rasnake v. Narick, 159 W. Va. 542 (1976)
The decision of the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (1972), has caused some confusion relative to the continued vitality of the McGautha case.
Questioned by State v. Petrovich, 125 N.J. Super. 147 (1973)
" In addition, there are substantial questions as to the continuing validity of the majority opinion in McGautha inasmuch as the more recent case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), held that the death penalty was "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment and hence unconstitutional as applied to the defendants before that court in the particular combinat…
The opinion
Separate opinion of
Mr. Justice Black.
I concur in the Court’s judgments and in substantially all of its opinion. However, in my view, this Court’s task is not to determine whether the petitioners’ trials were “fairly conducted.” Ante, at 221. The Constitution grants this Court no power to reverse convictions because of our personal beliefs that state criminal procedures are “unfair,” “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “unreasonable,” or “shocking to our conscience.” See, e. g., Rockin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 174 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 243 (1967) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). Our *226 responsibility is rather to determine whether petitioners have been denied rights expressly or impliedly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution as written. I agree with the Court’s conclusions that the procedures employed by California and Ohio to determine whether capital punishment shall be imposed do not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Likewise, I do not believe that petitioners have been deprived of any other right explicitly or impliedly guaranteed by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Eighth Amendment forbids “cruel and unusual punishments.” In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end capital punishment by the Amendment. Although some people have urged that this Court should amend the Constitution by interpretation to keep it abreast of modern ideas, I have never believed that lifetime judges in our system have any such legislative power. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 670 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).