holding that declaratory relief is improper when a prosecution involving the challenged state statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated, and the same principles that govern the propriety of federal injunctions of State criminal proceedings govern the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings
How later courts described this case
- holding that declaratory relief is improper when a prosecution involving the challenged state statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated, and the same principles that govern the propriety of federal injunctions of State criminal proceedings govern the issuance of federal declaratory judgments in connection with such proceedings
- holding that the Younger doctrine requires dismissal of claims for both injunctive and declaratory relief because “the basic policy against federal interference with pending state [proceedings] will be frustrated as much by a declaratory judgment as it would be by an injunction”
- holding that “ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid”
- explaining that when “the practical effect of the two forms of relief will be virtually identical,” the “propriety of declaratory and injunc-tive relief should be judged by essentially the same standards”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall join, concurring in the result.
I agree that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. All the appellants had been indicted for violation of the New York Criminal Anarchy Law before *76 their suit in federal court was filed. They have not alleged facts amounting to bad-faith harassment. Therefore, neither a declaratory judgment nor an injunction would be proper. Perez v. Ledesma, post, p. 93 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).