recognizing that a federal court could halt state criminal proceedings if threatened criminal proceedings were " 'not made with any expectation of securing valid convictions, but rather [as] part of a plan to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate [certain] constitutional rights’ ” (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965))
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that a federal court could halt state criminal proceedings if threatened criminal proceedings were " 'not made with any expectation of securing valid convictions, but rather [as] part of a plan to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate [certain] constitutional rights’ ” (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965))
- explaining that the “longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings,” derives, in part, from “the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”
- stating that “Our Federalism” represents “a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States” (quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “[wjhere a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but — while regulating a subject within the state’s power — tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well-settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) — not on the Supreme Court's list
401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 749, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972).
Questioned by Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, 83 F. Supp. 3d 635 (2015)
However, the recent Supreme Court case Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013), casts doubt on the earlier circuit court analyses that led district courts to rely on Younger to abstain from considering cases such as this one.
Questioned by Strickland-Lucas v. Citibank, N.A., 256 F. Supp. 3d 616 (2017)
As noted by Judge Paul Grimm of this Court, the case of Sprint Communications, Inc. “casts doubt on the earlier circuit court analyses that led district courts to rely on Younger to abstain from considering eases such as this one”, when there is a pending foreclosure action in state court.
Declined to follow by Jones v. Takaki, 832 F. Supp. 1224 (1993)
However, we reject defendants' attempted application of Younger under these circumstances as inconsistent with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 854, 860 n. 9, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Alexander v. Morgan, 353 F. Supp. 3d 622 (2018)
The Sixth Circuit has held that Younger is inapplicable when there are federal questions that do not "entangle us in the merits of the state child support proceedings, and accordingly we may answer them without treading on protected state interests.
Distinguished by Helms Realty Corp. v. City of N.Y., 320 F. Supp. 3d 526 (2018)
In the case at hand, Younger abstention is inapplicable to any of the three state court actions.
Distinguished by S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Whitfield, 329 F. Supp. 3d 191 (2018)
However, the case law supporting abstention under the Younger , Burford , and Pullman doctrines is distinguishable because in the present case, an appeal is not currently available, and Act 287 and Resolution 285 prevent SCE & G from raising constitutional challenges in a state court proceeding at this time.
Distinguished by Odonnell v. Harris Cnty., 321 F. Supp. 3d 763 (2018)
Because the relief sought by the plaintiffs-"the adequacy of the state court review of bail-setting procedures"-"is not properly reviewed by criminal proceedings in state court," Younger is inapplicable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall join, concurring in the result.
I agree that the judgment of the District Court should be reversed. Appellee Harris had been indicted for violations of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act before he sued in federal court. He has not alleged that the prosecution was brought in bad faith to harass him. His constitutional contentions may be adequately adjudi *57 cated in the state criminal proceeding, and federal intervention at his instance was therefore improper. *
Appellees Hirseh and Dan have alleged that they “feel inhibited” by the statute and the prosecution of Harris from advocating the program of the Progressive Labor Party. Appellee Broslawsky has alleged that he “is uncertain” whether as an instructor in college history he can under the statute give instruction relating to the Communist Manifesto and similar revolutionary works. None of these appellees has stated any ground for a reasonable expectation that he will actually be prosecuted under the statute for taking the actions contemplated. The court below expressly declined to rely on any finding “that . . . Dan, Hirseh or Broslawsky stand [s] in any danger of prosecution by the [State], because of the activities that they ascribed to themselves in the com *58 plaint . . . 281 F. Supp. 507, 516 . It is true, as the court below pointed out, that “[w]ell-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law,” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 373 (1964), but still there must be a live controversy under Art. III. No threats of prosecution of these appellees are alleged. Although Dan and Hirsch have alleged that they desire to advocate doctrines of the Progressive Labor Party, they have not asserted that their advocacy will be of the same genre as that which brought on the prosecution of Harris. In short, there is no reason to think that California has any ripe controversy with them. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969); Perez v. Ledesma, post, p. 93 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
The District Court erroneously interpreted Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241 (1967), as.authorizing federal court consideration of a constitutional claim at issue in a pending state proceeding, whether or not the federal court plaintiff had presented his claim to the state court. It suffices here to note that in Zwickler no state proceeding was pending at the time jurisdiction attached in the federal court. The court below also thought it significant that appellee Harris had raised his constitutional claim in the state courts in a motion to dismiss the indictment and in petitions in the state appellate courts for a writ of prohibition. It was questioned at oral argument whether constitutional issues could properly be raised by the procedures invoked by Harris, and it was suggested that the denial of Harris’ motions did not necessarily involve rejection of his constitutional claims. However, even if the California courts had at that interlocutory stage rejected Harris’ constitutional arguments, that rejection would not have provided a justification for intervening by the District Court. Harris could have sought direct review of that rejection of his constitutional claims or he could have renewed the claims in requests for instructions, and on direct review of any conviction in the state courts and in this Court. These were the proper modes for presentation and these the proper forums for consideration of the constitutional issues.