finding that double jeopardy attached where the trial court precipitously discharged the jury upon concluding that the state's witnessestaxpayers whom the defendant was alleged to have willfully assisted in the preparation of fraudulent tax returnshad not been properly advised of their constitutional rights, and it was "abundantly apparent" from the record that "the trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound discretion to assure that, taking all the circumstances into account, there was a manifest necessity for the sua sponte declaration of this mistrial"
How later courts described this case
- finding that double jeopardy attached where the trial court precipitously discharged the jury upon concluding that the state's witnessestaxpayers whom the defendant was alleged to have willfully assisted in the preparation of fraudulent tax returnshad not been properly advised of their constitutional rights, and it was "abundantly apparent" from the record that "the trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound discretion to assure that, taking all the circumstances into account, there was a manifest necessity for the sua sponte declaration of this mistrial"
- holding that trial judge did not exercise sound discretion in granting mistrial after he precipitously, and without warning to the parties, discharged the jury because he refused to believe the prosecuting attorney’s assurances that taxpayer witnesses had been given adequate warnings of their constitutional rights
- finding the "trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound discretion" where he "acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that, had the prosecutor been disposed to suggest a continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to do so"
- holding the “doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant’s option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) — not on the Supreme Court's list
400 U.S. 470, 477-78, 91 S.Ct. 547, 553, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion) (applying earlier version of § 3731), overruled on other grounds, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672-78, 102 S.Ct. at 2088-91; 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper,
Distinguished
Distinguished by Douglas v. United States, 1985 D.C. App. LEXIS 295 (1985)
Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be understood to have consented to a mistrial, and the rule that “a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution,” United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion), is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Williams, 262 Pa. Super. 508 (1979)
United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971), which appellant cites in support of his position, is clearly inapposite, as it involves the trial court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial.
The opinion
Me. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I join in the plurality opinion and in the judgment of the Court not without some reluctance, however, since the case represents a plain frustration. of the right to *488 have this case tried, .attributable solely to the conduct of the trial judge, If the accused had brought about the erroneous mistrial ruling we would have a different case, but this record shows nothing to take appellee’s claims outside the classic mold of being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Brennan believe that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal under 18. U. S. C. § 3731 because the action of the trial judge amounted to an acquittal of appellee and therefore there was no discretion left, to the trial judge to put appellee again in jeopardy. However, in view of a decision by a majority of the Court to reach the merits, they join the judgment of the Court.