concluding that the same judge who was subject to a trial lawyer's insults that were "apt to strike at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament" was precluded from deciding the criminal contempt charges against the lawyer in order for "justice [to] satisfy the appearance of justice"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the same judge who was subject to a trial lawyer's insults that were "apt to strike at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament" was precluded from deciding the criminal contempt charges against the lawyer in order for "justice [to] satisfy the appearance of justice"
- holding that Due Process requires that a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding be tried before a judge other than the judge who had determined in an earlier proceeding that contempt charges should be brought against the defendant because of the high potential for bias against the defendant
- holding that due-process principles prevent a judge from waiting until the end of a trial to render a summary contempt conviction when the individual makes “highly personal aspersions” that “are apt to strike at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge’s temperament”
- holding that a judge who charged a litigant with contempt for salacious personal attacks could not preside over the litigant’s contempt proceedings because “[n]o one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detach- ment necessary for fair adjudication”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Chief Justice Buegee,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s opinion and add these additional observations chiefly for emphasis. Certain aspects of the problem of maintaining in courtrooms the indispensable atmosphere of quiet orderliness are crucial. Without order and quiet, the adversary process must fail. Three factors should be noted: (1) as Me. Justice Douglas has said, the trial was conducted without the guidance af *467 forded by Mr. Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 ; (2) although the accused was afforded counsel at his trial he asserted a right to act as his own counsel and the court permitted him to do so; (3) we are hot informed whether Pennsylvania has a statute covering obstruction of justice that would reach the conduct of the accused shown by this record.
(1)
As the Court’s opinion suggests, the standards of ■ Illinois v. Allen, supra, would have enabled the trial judge to remove the accused from the courtroom after his first outrageous actions and words, and to summarily punish him for contempt. The contempt power, however, is of limited utility in dealing with an incorrigible, a cunning psychopath, or an accused bent on frustrating the particular trial or undermining the processes of justice. For such as these, summary removal from the courtroom is the really effective remedy. Indeed it is one, as this case shows, where removal could well be a benefit to the accused in the sense that one episode of contemptuous conduct would be less likely to turn a jury against him than 11 episodes. As noted by Mr. Justice Black in Illinois v. Allen , and Mr. Justice Douglas here,, a fixed .rule to fit every situation is not feasible; plainly summary removal is the most salutary remedy in cases such as this.
(2)
Here the accused was acting as his own counsel but had a court-appointed lawyer as well. This suggests the wisdom of the-trial judge in having counsel remain in the case even in the limited role of a consultant. When a defendant refuses counsel, as he did here, or seeks to discharge him, a trial judge is well advised — as so many do-to have such “standby counsel” to perform all the serv *468 ices a trained advocate would perform ordinarily by examination and cross-examination of witnesses, objecting to evidence and making closing argument. No circumstance that comes to mind allows an accused to interfere with the absolute right of a trial judge to have such “standby counsel” to protect the rights of accused persons “foolishly trying to defend themselves,” as Mr. Justice Douglas so aptly described it. In every trial there is more at stake than just the interests of the ac- ' cused; the integrity of the process warrants a trial judge’s , exercising his discretion to have counsel participate in the defense even when rejected. A criminal trial is not a private matter; the public interest is so great that the presence and participation of counsel, even when opposed by the accused, is warranted in order to vindicate the process itself. The value of the precaution of having independent counsel, even if unwanted, is underscored by situations where the accused is removed from the courtroom under Illinois v. Allen . The presence of counsel familiar with the case would- at the very least blunt Sixth Amendment claims, assuming they would have merit, when the accused has refused legal assistance and then brought about his own removal from the proceedings.
(3)
There are other means to cope with grave misconduct in the courtroom, whether that of the accused, his counsel, spectators, or others. Statutes defining obstruction of. justice have long been in force in many States, with penálties measured in years of confinement. Such statutes, where available, are an obvious response to those who seek to frustrate a particular trial or undermine, the processes of justice generally.
A review of this record warrants a closing comment on the exemplary patience of the trial judge under provo *469 cation few human beings could accept with equanimity. Our holding that contempt cases with penalties of the magnitude imposed here should be heard by another judge does not reflect on his performance; it relates rather to a question of procedure.