holding that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime,” or even if his guilty plea contains “a protestation of innocence when . . . a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[a]n individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime,” or even if his guilty plea contains “a protestation of innocence when . . . a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt.”
- stating that inquiry into whether the trial court properly advised a defendant of the constitutional rights “is not limited solely to the information provided to the defendant by the trial court. We examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. ‘A defendant may learn of information not relayed to him by the trial court from other sources, such as his attorney’”
- determining that a court may accept a plea of guilty to second-degree murder when the State has strong evidence of guilt of first-degree murder even though the defendant claims that he is innocent, if the defendant, represented by competent counsel, intelligently concludes that he should plead guilty to second-degree murder rather than be tried for first-degree murder
- holding that a defendant may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly plead guilty and consent to be sentenced even if he is unwilling to admit to his participation in the crime when he is represented by competent counsel, he intelligently concludes that his interests require a guilty plea, and the record strongly evidences his guilt
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Valdez, 269 F. App'x 805 (2008)
400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), but that case is inapposite as it dealt with a guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence.
Distinguished by State v. Fletchinger, 51 Ohio App. 2d 73 (1977)
(1970), 400 U. S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall .join,
dissenting.
Last Term, this Court held, over my dissent, that a plea of guilty may validly be induced by an unconstitutional threat to subject the defendant to the risk of death, so long as the plea is entered in open court and the defendant, is represented by competent counsel who is aware of the threat, albeit' not of its unconstitutionality. Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 745-758 *40 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 795 (1970). Today the Court makes clear that its previous holding was intended to apply even when the record demonstrates that the actual effect of the unconstitutional threat was to induce a guilty plea from a defendant who was unwilling to admit his guilt.
I adhere to the view that, in any given case, the influence of such an unconstitutional threat “must necessarily be given weight in determining the voluntariness of a plea.” Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S., at 805 (dissent). And, without reaching the question whether due process permits the entry of judgment upon a plea of guilty accompanied by a contemporaneous denial of acts constituting the crime, 1 I believe that at the very least such a denial of guilt is also a relevant factor in determining whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. With these factors in mind, it is sufficient in my view to state that the facts set out in the majority opinion demonstrate that Alford was “so gripped by fear of the death penalty” 2 that his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary but was “the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint.” Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 606 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The courts of appeals have expressed varying opinions on this question. Compare McCoy v. United States, 124 U. S. App. D. C. 177, 179-180, 363 F. 2d 306, 308-309 (1966); Bruce v. United States, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 342 n. 17, 379 F. 2d 113 , 119 n. 17 (1967); Griffin v. United States, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 108, 109-110, 405 F. 2d 1378, 1379-1380 (1968); Maxwell v. United States, 368 F. 2d 735 , 739 n, 3 (CA9 1966) (court may accept guilty plea from defendant unable or unwilling to admit guilt), with United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F. 2d 790, 801-802 (CA3 1968); Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F. 2d 155 , 158 n. 7 (CA4 1968); Hulsey v. United States, 369 F. 2d 284, 287 (CA5 1966) (guilty plea is infirm if accompanied’ by denial of one or more elements of offense).
Brady v. United States, 397 U. S., at 750 .