stating that essential feature of jury trial is the “interposition ... of the commonsense judgment of a group of lay[persons], and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence”
How later courts described this case
- stating that essential feature of jury trial is the “interposition ... of the commonsense judgment of a group of lay[persons], and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence”
- stating that "the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance except to mystics” (internal quotations and citation omitted)
- stating that the number of petit *899 jurors should “be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the community.”
- holding that a state may require defendants to provide the prosecution with advance notice of an alibi defense without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourteenth Amendment due process protections
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded — as noted by a later court — not on the Supreme Court's list
After Williams, however, the constitutional interpretation upon which Rule 48 was based is no longer valid.
unconfirmed confidenceDeclined to follow by State v. Hamm, 1988 Minn. LEXIS 94 (1988)
In interpreting our state constitution, we decline to follow the same path taken by Williams in interpreting the federal Constitution.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989)
It has been argued that the Williams analysis is inapplicable to this context, where “litigational use” is made of the notice.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
dissenting in part.
I join Part I of the Court’s opinion. However, since I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed Williams a jury of 12 to pass upon the question of his guilt or innocence before he could be sent to prison for the rest of his life, I dissent from the affirmance of his conviction.
I adhere to the holding of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 149 (1968), that “[bjecause . . . trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . . the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which — were they to be tried in a federal court — would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.” And I agree with *117 the Court that the same “trial by jury” is guaranteed to state defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment as to federal defendants by the Sixth. “Once it is decided that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice’ . . . the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.” Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 795 (1969).
At the same time, I adhere to the decision of the Court in Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 349 (1898), that the jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment consists “of twelve persons, neither more nor less.” As I see it, the Court has not made out a convincing case that the Sixth Amendment should be read differently than it was in Thompson even if the matter were now before us de novo — much less that an unbroken line of precedent going back over 70 years should be overruled. The arguments made by Mr. Justice Harlan in Part IB of his opinion persuade me that Thompson was right when decided and still states sound doctrine. I am equally convinced that the requirement of 12 should be applied to the States.