explaining that determining the preclusive effect of a prior judgment requires courts to “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that determining the preclusive effect of a prior judgment requires courts to “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration” (citation omitted)
- explaining that when judgment of acquittal is based on a general verdict, the reviewing tribunal must “examine the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.”
- stating that when a previous judgment of acquittal is based on a general verdict, the court must “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration”
- recognizing an issue preclusion component to the federal Double Jeopardy Clause and concluding that, when the defendant was acquitted for the robbery of one person based on the state’s failure to prove the defendant’s identity as one of the robbers, the state was precluded from relitigating that issue in a trial for the robbery of another person during the same incident
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow on other grounds by Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990)
397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970), limited on other grounds Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990).
Limited by United States v. Arterbury, 322 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (2018)
Citing Ashe, plaintiff responded that collateral estoppel was inapplicable to the pretrial suppression motion because when it was decided defendant was not in jeopardy.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Waters, 560 S.W.3d 651 (2018)
Ashe is distinguishable because, in that case, Ashe was subjected to criminal prosecution for an offense, followed by a second attempt at prosecution under circumstances that would have required relitigation of the same facts already found in his favor in the first trial.
Distinguished by State v. Atkins, 304 Ga. 413 (2018)
Ashe does not apply, and we disapprove Moore as in conflict with later United States Supreme Court precedent.
Distinguished by State v. Muniz, Unpublished Decision (7-28-2006), 2006 Ohio 3975 (2006)
Similarly, the Ashe cases are also distinguishable.
Distinguished by State v. Esco, 2005 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 98 (2005)
Moreover, the collateral estoppel theory applied in Ashe is inapplicable to this case.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
If I were to judge this case under the traditional standards of Fourteenth Amendment due process, I would adhere to the decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U. S. 464 (1958), believing that regardless of the reach of the federal rule of collateral estoppel, it would have been open to a state court to treat the issue differently. However, having acceded in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 744 (1969), to the decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), which, over my dissent, held that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the States the standards of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, I am satisfied that on this present record Ashe’s acquittal in the first trial brought double jeopardy standards into play. Hence, I join the Court’s opinion. In doing so I wish to make explicit my understanding that the Court’s opinion in no way intimates that the Double Jeopardy Clause embraces to any degree the “same transaction” concept reflected in the concurring opinion of my Brother Brennan.