holding that city and state in which it was political subdivision could not bring successive prosecutions for same unlawful conduct despite fact that state law treated them as separate sovereigns
How later courts described this case
- holding that city and state in which it was political subdivision could not bring successive prosecutions for same unlawful conduct despite fact that state law treated them as separate sovereigns
- abolishing the dual sovereignty doctrine and holding that double jeopardy prohibited Waller’s prosecution in Florida circuit court for grand larceny based on the same acts that formed the basis of his prosecution in municipal court for ordinance violations
- holding that because a municipal and state court are part of one sovereign judicial system, successive prosecutions are not prosecutions by separate sovereigns
- overturning dual sovereignty exception to double jeopardy and concluding petitioner could not be tried for same offense in both municipal court and state court
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Norwood, 351 So. 2d 122 (1977)
Waller v. Florida, supra, is inapplicable to the case before us because it involved a question of double jeopardy not presented here.
Distinguished by State v. Johnson, 1976 Mo. App. LEXIS 2354 (1976)
Applying this principle to our case, Waller is distinguishable because the charge of driving while intoxicated, which requires proof of intoxication, is not identical with the charge of improper backing.
Distinguished by People v. Taylor, 66 Misc. 2d 1058 (1971)
Waller v. Florida is distinguishable in that the convictions here were of State statutes and not municipal ones and the State scheme includes the aforesaid subdivision (d) of section 1800 of the Vehicle 'and Traffic Law.
Distinguished by People v. Colombo, 29 N.Y.2d 1 (1971)
Waller is inapplicable to the facts of this case for several reasons.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the holding of the Court that, because the municipal and state courts of a State are part of one *396 sovereign judicial system, successive prosecutions in the municipal and state courts are not prosecutions by separate sovereign entities. Moreover, for the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Ashe v. Swenson, post, p. 448, I believe that, unless this case fell within one of the exceptions to the “same transaction” rule, see, id., at 453 n. 7, 455 n. 11, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second trial since all the charges grew out of the same criminal episode. *
I adhere to the Court’s holding in Ashe v. Swenson, post, at 437 n. 1, that our decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), holding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States, is “fully ‘retroactive.’ ” See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969).