stating that the “guarantee [within the Double Jeopardy Clause] has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the “guarantee [within the Double Jeopardy Clause] has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”
- holding that a judge who imposes a more severe sentence after the original sentence is successfully attacked must affirmatively state objective reasons for the harsher sentence to ensure that vindictiveness against the defendant plays no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial
- holding that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction, thus affirming defendant’s higher sentence on being reconvicted, after he had been tried and convicted, appealed, and won a new trial
- explaining that double jeopardy is not implicated where a defendant successfully appeals his conviction, has a new trial, and receives a higher sentence because "the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 194, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 12, 1989662 citing opinionsother groundsofficial confidenceRead itDeclined to follow by Williams v. State, 226 Ga. App. 720 (1997)
Therefore, we decline to extend the requirements of Pearce to the present situation.
Declined to follow by State v. Bawdon, 1986 S.D. LEXIS 250 (1986)
We decline to apply the prophylactic Pearce rule in this case and agree with the Fifth Circuit decision.
Declined to follow by Commonwealth v. DeCaro, 298 Pa. Super. 32 (1982)
Accordingly, we decline to follow appellant’s suggestion that we apply Pearce to Philadelphia’s system.
Declined to follow by Castleberry v. State, 1984 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 724 (1984)
“Once again, in following this Court’s recent pronouncement in Frank, we reject the applicability of Pearce when a plea bargaining situation is present, and look instead to Frank for instruction.* * The critical factor is ... the presence or absence of plea negotiations.
Declined to follow by Shiflett v. State, 1975 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1099 (1975)
However, we decline to extend Pearce to the instant case.
and 2 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Adams v. State, 287 Ga. 513 (2010)
In Texas v. McCullough, supra, under similar facts, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Pearce presumption was inapplicable.
Distinguished by Daniel Lee Webb v. State (2006)
clarified that the Pearce presumption is inapplicable and the due process clause is not
Distinguished by State v. Runyon, 944 So. 2d 820 (2006)
Where the court "merely impose[s] the same sentence for the same conduct," the sentence has not been increased and the Pearce presumption is inapplicable.
Distinguished by State v. Harris, Unpublished Decision (3-24-2006), 2006 Ohio 1396 (2006)
However, in Texas v. McCullough (1986), 475 U.S. 134,106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104, the court clarified the Pearce holding stating: "The presumption [of vindictiveness] is also inapplicable because different sentencers assessed the varying sentences that [the defendant] received.
The opinion
Mr. Justice White,
concurring in part.
I join the Court’s opinion except that in my view Part II-C should authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding.