holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 19 Iqbal
How later courts described this case
- holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 19 Iqbal
- holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after 12 Iqbal
- holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally 25 construed after Iqbal
- holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally 18 construed after Iqbal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367 (1999)
A similar argument was made in Paul v. Davis, which the Court rejected holding that Jenkins was inapplicable.
Distinguished by United States v. Melvin L. Schutterle and Martha E. Schutterle, 586 F.2d 1201 (1978)
395 U.S. 411, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1968), is inapposite.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Black,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment and in much of what is said in the prevailing opinion. I cannot agree, however, to reaffirming Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420 . I joined the dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Hannah case and still adhere to that dissent. The Louisiana law here, like the federal law considered in the Hannah case, is, in my judgment, nothing more nor less than a scheme for a nonjudicial tribunal to charge, try, convict, and punish people without courts, without juries, without lawyers, without witnesses — in short, without *433 any of the procedural protections that the Bill of Rights provides. The Louisiana law is reminiscent of the old Parliamentary and Ecclesiastical Commission trials which took away the liberty of John Lilburne and his contemporaries without due process of law — that is, without giving them the benefit of a trial in accordance with the law of the land. For these reasons I believe that the Louisiana law denies due process of law.