holding that because a -“classification of welfare applicants according, to whether they have lived in the State for one year ... touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest”
How later courts described this case
- holding that because a -“classification of welfare applicants according, to whether they have lived in the State for one year ... touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest”
- stating that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that ... our constitutional concepts of personal liberty ... require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”
- stating that the Constitution requires that “all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.” (emphasis added)
- holding that the suggestion “that the one-year waiting period is justified as a means of encouraging new residents to join the labor force promptly. . .would also require a similar waiting period for long term residents of [a][s]tate”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 148, expressly overruled).
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 13, 1974109 citing opinionsother groundsin partofficial confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by DAVIS v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 2016 OK CIV APP 23 (2016)
First, Saenz and Shapiro are distinguishable.
Distinguished by R. H. MacY & Co. v. Contra Costa County, 226 Cal. App. 3d 352 (1990)
Thompson, supra, 394 U.S. 618) are distinguishable because the legislative classifications therein were all based upon length of residence.
Distinguished by Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133 (1990)
394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), is inapplicable because we have neither a suspect class nor a
Distinguished by Richard Lucas v. United States of America, Richard Lucas, Cross-Appellees v. United States of America, Cross-Appellant, 807 F.2d 414 (1986)
394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), is inapplicable because we have neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right in issue.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
In joining the opinion of the Court, I add a word in response to the dissent of my Brother Harlan, who, I think, has quite misapprehended what the Court’s opinion says.
The Court today does not “pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental/, and give them added protection . . . .” To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands.
“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.” United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 757 . This constitutional right, which, of course, includes the right of “entering and abiding in any State in the Union,” Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 39 , is not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and control under conven *643 tional due process or equal protection standards. 1 “ [T] he right to travel freely from State to State finds constitutional protection that is quite independent of the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Guest, supra, at 760, n. 17 . 2 As we made clear in Guest , it is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. 3 Like the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 , it is a virtually unconditional personal right, 4 guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.
It follows, as the Court says, that “the purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as justification for the classification created by the one-year waiting period, since that purpose is constitutionally impermissible.” And it further follows, as the Court says, that any other purposes offered in support of a *644 law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional right of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a compelling governmental interest. This is necessarily true whether the impinging law be a classification statute to be tested against the Equal Protection Clause, or a state or federal regulatory law, to be tested against the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment. As MR. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court more than a decade ago, “[T]o justify the deterrent effect ... on the free exercise ... of their constitutionally protected right . . . a ‘. . . subordinating interest of the State must be compelling.' ” NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463 .
The Court today, therefore, is not “contriving new constitutional principles.” It is deciding these cases under the aegis of established constitutional law. 5
By contrast, the “right” of international travel has been considered to be no more than an aspect of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 125 ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 505-506 . As such, this “right,” the Court has held, can be regulated within the bounds of due process. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 .
The constitutional right of interstate travel was fully recognized long before adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See the statement of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7. How. 283, 492:
“For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.”
Mr. Justice Harlan was alone in dissenting from this square holding in Guest. Supra, at 762 .
The extent of emergency governmental power temporarily to prevent or control interstate travel, e. g., to a disaster area, need not be considered in these cases.
It is to be remembered that the Court today affirms the judgments of three different federal district courts, and that at least four other federal courts have reached the same result. See ante, at 622, n. 1.