explaining that a general verdict in a bench trial must be set aside if “we cannot know that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground” (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a general verdict in a bench trial must be set aside if “we cannot know that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground” (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942))
- holding unconstitutional, as applied, a statute that punished words that cast contempt on the flag of the United States
- assuming conviction otherwise passed muster on constitutional grounds, “nothing ... would render the conviction impermissible merely because an element of the crime was proved by defendant’s words rather than in some other way.”
- collateral effects of malicious mischief conviction in which sentence was suspended were (1) that defendant’s employer had instituted disciplinary proceedings against him based on the conviction which might have resulted in fining or temporarily suspending defendant without pay, and (2) the conviction would be available for use to impeach defendant’s credibility, and for sentencing purposes, in future court cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. McNamara, 274 Or. 565 (1976)
Street is clearly distinguishable from the present case.
Distinguished by United States v. Sharon K. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (1972)
Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969), is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Fortas,
dissenting.
I agree with the dissenting opinion filed by The Chief Justice, but I believe that it is necessary briefly to set forth the reasons why the States and the Federal Government have the power to protect the flag from acts of desecration committed in public.
If the national flag were nothing more than a chattel, subject only to the rules governing the use of private personalty, its use would nevertheless be subject to certain types of state regulation. For example, regulations concerning the use of chattels which are reasonably designed to avoid danger to life or property, or impingement upon the rights of others to the quiet use of their property and of public facilities, would unquestionably be a valid exercise of police power. They would not *616 necessarily be defeated by a claim that they conflicted with the rights of the owner of the regulated property. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954).
If a state statute provided that it is a misdemeanor to burn one’s shirt or trousers or shoes on the public thoroughfare, it could hardly be asserted that the citizen’s constitutional right is violated. If the arsonist asserted that he was burning his shirt or trousers or shoes as a protest against the Government’s fiscal policies, for example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment shelter would prevail against the State’s claim of a right to avert danger to the public and to avoid obstruction to traffic as a result of the fire. This is because action, even if clearly for serious protest purposes, is not entitled to the pervasive protection that is given to speech alone. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303-304 (1940). It may be subjected to reasonable regulation that appropriately takes into account the competing interests involved.
The test that is applicable in every case where conduct is restricted or prohibited is whether the regulation or prohibition is reasonable, due account being taken of the paramountcy of First Amendment values. If, as I submit, it is permissible to prohibit the burning of personal property on the public sidewalk, there is no basis for applying a different rule to flag burning. And the fact that the law is violated for purposes of protest does not immunize the violator. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968); see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
Beyond this, however, the flag is a special kind of personalty. Its use is traditionally and universally subject to special rules and regulation. As early as 1907, this Court affirmed the constitutionality of a state statute making it a crime to use a representation of the United *617 States flag for purposes of advertising. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907). Statutes prescribe how the flag may be displayed; how it may lawfully be disposed of; when, how, and for what purposes it may and may not be used. See, e. g., 4 U. S. C. § 3 ; 56 Stat. 377 , c. 435, 36 U. S. C. §§ 172-177 . A person may “own” a flag, but ownership is subject to special burdens and responsibilities. A flag may be property, in a sense; but it is property burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions. Certainly, as Halter v. Nebraska, supra, held, these special conditions are not per se arbitrary or beyond governmental power under our Constitution.
One may not justify burning a house, even if it is his own, on the ground, however sincere, that he does so as a protest. One may not justify breaking the windows of a government building on that basis. Protest does not exonerate lawlessness. And the prohibition against flag burning on the public thoroughfare being valid, the misdemeanor is not excused merely because it is an act of flamboyant protest.