holding that defendant was in custody when police entered suspect’s bedroom at 4:00 a.m. and questioned him and where, at trial, an officer testified that the suspect had been “under arrest” from the time the officers entered the bedroom and was not free to leave
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant was in custody when police entered suspect’s bedroom at 4:00 a.m. and questioned him and where, at trial, an officer testified that the suspect had been “under arrest” from the time the officers entered the bedroom and was not free to leave
- finding that a person who was interrogated while on his own bed, at home, in familiar surroundings, was “in custody” for the purposes of interrogation by four police officers when he was under arrest and not free to leave at the time of questioning
- holding that defendant’s statements, made to four officers while in his bedroom without Miranda warnings, were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment because defendant was under arrest and not free to leave
- holding that exception to the Miranda rule was not warranted where police officers entered the defendant’s boardinghouse four hours after a murder, awakened him, and interrogated him as to whether he owned a gun
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Dennis, 373 Ill. App. 3d 30 (2007)
In reaching its holding, the Court in Quarles distinguished Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 22 L. Ed. 2d 311, 89 S. Ct. 1095 (1969), as a case in which the public safety exception was inapplicable because exigent circumstances did not exist.
Distinguished by Marguerite A. Amass v. United States, 413 F.2d 272 (1969)
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), relied on by appellant, is distinguishable because defendant there at the time of questioning had obviously been “deprived of his freedom of action” within the meaning of
The opinion
Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring.
The passage of time has not made the Miranda case any more palatable to me than it was when the case was decided. See my dissenting opinion, and that of Mr. Justice White, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 604, 526 (1966).
Yet, despite my strong inclination to join in the dissent of my Brother White, I can find no acceptable avenue of escape from Miranda in judging this case, especially in light of Mathis v. United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968), which has already extended the Miranda rules beyond the *328 police station, over the protest of Justices Stewart, White, and myself, id., at 5-8. Therefore, and purely out of respect for stare decisis, I reluctantly feel compelled to acquiesce in today’s decision of the Court, at the same time observing that the constitutional condemnation of this perfectly understandable, sensible, proper, and indeed commendable piece of police work highlights the unsoundness of Miranda .