concluding that, unlike in other cases involving the three-judge court requirement, the three-judge requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act should not be interpreted narrowly, because “generally a plaintiff attacking a state statute [under § 5] could also make at least a substantial constitutional claim”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that, unlike in other cases involving the three-judge court requirement, the three-judge requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act should not be interpreted narrowly, because “generally a plaintiff attacking a state statute [under § 5] could also make at least a substantial constitutional claim”
- stating that the local school board had “charged that numerous statements in the letter were false and that the publication of the statements unjustifiably impugned the motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence of both the [bjoard and the school administration.”
- finding that legislative history of Voting Rights Act “supports the view that Congress intended to reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way” including a new procedure for write-in votes and changing from paper ballots to voting machines
- holding the language "voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure" was employed in § 2 in order to be "all-inclusive of any kind of practice" that might be used to deny citizens the right to vote
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Mr. Justice Marshall,
whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins,
concurring and dissenting.
I join Parts I through V of the Court’s opinion. However, largely for the reasons stated in Part II of my *595 Brother Harlan’s opinion, I believe the relief suggested by the Solicitor General should be ordered in the Mississippi cases. Accordingly, I dissent from Part VI of the Court’s opinion.